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Advisory committees are a ubiquitous, yet understudied feature of the
administrative state. More than seventy-five thousand experts from outside the federal government serve on over one thousand committees
across the Executive Branch, providing agencies with informed “second
opinions” to complement their in-house experts in the civil service. By
law, these committees must be “fairly balanced in terms of the points of
view represented.” Yet little is known about whether advisory committees
live up to this standard, under what circumstances agencies utilize these
panels, and how advisory committees influence agency decisionmaking.
This Article sheds light on the composition and operation of advisory committees. We begin by gathering data on the campaign contribution histories of
more than one thousand randomly selected advisory committee members over
twenty-one years and across four administrations. We find—notwithstanding
the statutory fair-balance requirement—that these committees lean left during
Democratic administrations and right during Republican ones.
We then examine agency engagement with advisory committees over the
same timeframe. Combining these data with information on the political
preferences of career civil servants, we find that agencies are more likely to
create and convene committees when the preferences of civil servants and
the presidential administration diverge. In other words, Democratic administrations appear to rely more on advisory committees at agencies with relatively conservative career staffs (such as the Pentagon), whereas
Republicans rely more on these outside panels at agencies with liberal-leaning careerists (such as the Environmental Protection Agency).
We supplement our quantitative analysis with case studies of four advisory
committees across four different agencies and presidential administrations.
Our case studies show how the political appointees at the helms of agencies
use advisory committees as substitute sources of information and expertise
when career civil servants at their agencies resist the administration’s agenda.
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These results point to a new view of advisory committees as important
instruments of presidential administration. In contrast to the so-called
“deep state” of career civil servants who persist at agencies across presidencies, we suggest that advisory committees constitute a “shallow
state” whose composition ebbs and flows with the political tides. This
“shallow state” presents both a contrast with and a counterweight to the
“deep state” of agency careerists. At the same time, advisory committees
serve a legitimating function for the administrative state, increasing
agency responsiveness to electoral politics. We conclude by considering
the implications of this account for judicial review of agency action and
for long-running separation-of-powers debates.
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INTRODUCTION
Each year, federal agencies consult with over one thousand advisory committees on a wide range of programs and policies.1 These advisory committees
include more than seventy-five thousand members drawn from the public, private, and nonprofit sectors2—more than ten times the total number of political
appointees across the Executive Branch.3 If all advisory committee members
“reclined end-to-end on a line due east of the Capitol,” an Associated Press reporter once noted, they could “build a human sidewalk to the Naval Academy” in
Annapolis, Maryland.4 Commentators have described these committees as a

1. See Reporting Fiscal Year 2017 Government Totals, FACA DATABASE, https://www.facadatabase.
gov/FACA/apex/FACAPublicTotals?fy=2017 [https://perma.cc/LD8G-SQ3R] (last visited Mar. 3,
2020).
2. Id.
3. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-249, FEDERAL ETHICS PROGRAMS:
GOVERNMENT-WIDE POLITICAL APPOINTEE DATA AND SOME ETHICS OVERSIGHT PROCEDURES AT
INTERIOR AND SBA COULD BE IMPROVED 8, 10 (2019). Somewhat surprisingly, “[n]o single source of
data on political appointees exists that is comprehensive, timely, and publicly available.” Id. at 10. The
most recent “Plum Book,” published in December 2016, lists four thousand political appointee
positions, but it does not reveal how many of these positions are vacant. See id. at 8, 10.
4. Lee Byrd, 1,020 Executive Panels Offer Lots of Advice—and It’s Not Free, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Dec. 10, 1989, at A45.
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“fifth branch” of the federal government5 and as a “mini-republic of ideas” within
the administrative state.6
Advisory committees wield influence over numerous aspects of American life,
from the food we eat and the water we drink to the air we breathe and the wars we
fight. A federal advisory committee drafts the dietary guidelines for federal
school breakfast and school lunch programs, “which feed more than 30 million
children each school day.”7 Advisory committees help to determine the acceptable levels of arsenic in our drinking water8 and ozone in our air.9 According to
several accounts, the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee led by Richard
Perle played an important role in President George W. Bush’s decision to invade
Iraq in 2003.10 And, while U.S. troops were fighting in the Middle East for a second time, a federal advisory committee played a central part in persuading
Congress to spend millions of dollars on treatment and research related to illnesses afflicting veterans of the 1990–1991 Gulf War.11
Although the “enormous influence” of advisory committees is widely recognized,12 the interactions between advisory committees and the other parts of
the federal government are not well understood. A number of scholars have
offered positive or normative accounts that address the relationship between
advisory committees and the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary, but these
accounts point in divergent directions. Some scholars cast advisory committees
as agents of the Legislature.13 Others argue that they are tools that the
5. See, e.g., SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS (1990);
Kevin D. Karty, Closure and Capture in Federal Advisory Committees, 4 BUS. & POL. 213, 214 (2002).
6. Sheila Jasanoff, (No?) Accounting for Expertise, 30 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 157, 161 (2003).
7. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2015–2020 DIETARY
GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS, at vii, 5 (8th ed. 2015). On advisory committee influence over dietary
guidelines, see MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES NUTRITION
AND HEALTH 378–81 (10th Anniversary ed. 2013).
8. See Brent Israelsen, EPA Upholds Stricter Guidelines on Arsenic Levels, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov.
1, 2001, at A1 (discussing National Drinking Water Advisory Council’s role in EPA’s 2001 decision to
lower arsenic standard from fifty parts per billion to ten parts per billion).
9. See Brad Knickerbocker, Smog Check: EPA Proposes Tougher Regs for Ground-Level Ozone
Pollution, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/2014/
1126/Smog-check-EPA-proposes-tougher-regs-for-ground-level-ozone-pollution (discussing the Clean
Air Scientific Advisory Committee’s role in setting ground-level ozone standards).
10. See ALEX MINTZ & KARL DEROUEN, UNDERSTANDING FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING 31
(2010); Ari Berman, Payments for Perle, NATION (July 31, 2003), https://www.thenation.com/article/
payments-perle; Seymour M. Hersh, Lunch with the Chairman, NEW YORKER (Mar. 9, 2003), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2003/03/17/lunch-with-the-chairman [https://perma.cc/F7WW-FJ3M].
11. See Gulf War Illness, CONGRESSIONALLY DIRECTED MED. RES. PROGRAMS (2015), https://cdmrp.
army.mil/gwirp/default [https://perma.cc/UT6E-DL7H] (last updated Feb. 26, 2020); Scott Shane,
Chemicals Sickened ’91 Gulf War Veterans, Latest Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2014), https://
www.nytimes.com/2004/10/15/politics/chemicals-sickened-91-gulf-war-veterans-latest-study-finds.html.
12. See Byrd, supra note 4.
13. See, e.g., Steven J. Balla & John R. Wright, Can Advisory Committees Facilitate Congressional
Oversight of the Bureaucracy?, in CONGRESS ON DISPLAY, CONGRESS AT WORK 167, 171–74 (William
T. Bianco ed., 2000) [hereinafter Balla & Wright, Can Advisory Committees]; Steven J. Balla & John R.
Wright, Interest Groups, Advisory Committees, and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy, 45 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 799, 799–800 (2001) [hereinafter Balla & Wright, Interest Groups].
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President14 and Executive Branch agencies15 use to gather information, build
support for their agendas, and manage reputational risk. A book-length study
of science-related advisory committees concludes that these bodies can serve
as lodestars for “technically illiterate” courts.16
These existing accounts tend to emphasize the role of advisory committees in
interactions among the branches. Existing accounts ask, for example, how
Congress can use advisory committees to control and monitor the Executive
Branch, how executive branch actors can use advisory committees to circumvent
congressionally imposed resource constraints, or how courts can use advisory
committees when engaged in judicial review of executive action. This focus on
external relations among the branches is consistent with the bulk of separationof-powers scholarship, though in tension with the lived experience of former
executive branch officials who emphasize the importance of intra-agency and
intrabranch interactions in the day-to-day doings of the administrative state.17
Our Article articulates a new model of advisory committees that situates these
panels as actors within an intra-agency framework. The idea that civil servants can
act as checks on the presidential administration has gained currency in recent years
as President Trump and his supporters have complained about a “deep state” of
career officials,18 whom they see as “out to get” the commander-in-chief.19
Meanwhile, a number of scholars and commentators have sought to repurpose the
term “deep state” to refer—with approbation rather than antipathy—to the civil
servants who check and balance the executive from within.20 They argue that
intra-agency dynamics between political appointees and civil servants plays “an

14. See Jay S. Bybee, Advising the President: Separation of Powers and the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, 104 YALE L.J. 51 (1994); Chad Levinson, Gilt by Associations: Appointments to
Federal Advisory Committees in U.S. National Security Politics, 49 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 97 (2019).
15. See Stéphane Lavertu & David L. Weimer, Federal Advisory Committees, Policy Expertise, and
the Approval of Drugs and Medical Devices at the FDA, 21 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 211, 231
(2010); Susan L. Moffitt, Promoting Agency Reputation Through Public Advice: Advisory Committee
Use in the FDA, 72 J. POL. 880, 880–81 (2010).
16. JASANOFF, supra note 5, at 249.
17. See, e.g., Paul D. Clement, The Intra-Executive Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 311 (2009)
(discussing his experience as Solicitor General); Peter L. Strauss, The Internal Relations of Government:
Cautionary Tales from Inside the Black Box, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155 (1998) (discussing his own
experience as general counsel to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission); see also Jennifer Nou, Agency
Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1758–59 (2013) (stating that the
“lopsided attention to judicial review in the literature” is “puzzling” in light of the primacy of intraexecutive checks on agency action).
18. See, e.g., JASON CHAFFETZ, THE DEEP STATE: HOW AN ARMY OF BUREAUCRATS PROTECTED
BARACK OBAMA AND IS WORKING TO DESTROY THE TRUMP AGENDA (2018); Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 6, 2018, 7:19 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1037661562897682432 [https://perma.cc/LJ34-MAYW].
19. Julian E. Barnes, Adam Goldman & Charlie Savage, Blaming the Deep State: Officials Accused
of Wrongdoing Adopt Trump’s Response, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
12/18/us/politics/deep-state-trump-classified-information.html.
20. See, e.g., Rebecca Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance and the National Security State, 104 IOWA L.
REV. 139, 143–44 (2018); Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability in the Deep State, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1532,
1534 (2018); Jon D. Michaels, The American Deep State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653, 1657 (2018).
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important, salutary, and quite possibly necessary role in safeguarding our constitutional commitments.”21
If the federal government’s two-million-plus civil servants constitute a “deep
state,” then its tens of thousands of advisory committee members might be seen
as a sort of “shallow state” existing alongside. The “shallow state” sobriquet captures at least two significant aspects of this phenomenon. First, whereas civil servants are protected by the federal merit system and often hold their jobs for
decades, the memberships of federal advisory committees ebb and flow with the
political tides. Members—or even entire committees—can be fired at the whim
of an agency head, and, as this Article demonstrates empirically, new administrations often seize the opportunity to stock these advisory panels with ideologically
sympathetic individuals. Second, the shallow state offers a counterbalance to the
deep. Federal advisory committees provide political appointees with an alternative source of knowledge and manpower when career civil servants might otherwise thwart the appointee’s agenda. Indeed, we demonstrate that political
appointees rely more on advisory committees when they are ideologically at odds
with the career bureaucrats in their agencies than when they are in sync with the
civil servants beneath them. Phrased in “deep state” and “shallow state” terms, it
is precisely when relations between political appointees and the deep state are
most tempestuous that the shallow state is most likely to be utilized.
Before developing and testing this shallow-state model, we provide an overview of the legal framework governing federal advisory committees and the
existing theoretical frameworks within which scholars have analyzed these panels
so far. We begin in Part I with the law—and, specifically, the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (FACA).22 Depending on whom one asks, FACA either succeeded in “enhancing the political legitimacy of the administrative state”23 or
“aggrandize[d] Congress’ relative powers over the President” to an unconstitutional degree.24 All agree, though, that the 1972 statute is central to the everyday
existence of advisory committees. If the Administrative Procedure Act is the
administrative state’s “Magna Charta,”25 then FACA is the shallow state’s own
version of the great charter.
After laying out the legal framework, Part II situates advisory committees visà-vis the three branches of government. We review studies suggesting that advisory committees act or ought to act as instruments of congressional control, as
auxiliaries to the Executive Branch, and as guides to courts. We then present our
own shallow state model, which posits that Presidents and their political

21. Michaels, supra note 20, at 1655.
22. Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. 2 §§ 1–16 (2012)).
23. Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Good
Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451, 527 (1997).
24. Bybee, supra note 14, at 128.
25. Michael Asimow, The Administrative Judiciary: ALJ’s in Historical Perspective, 20 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 157, 163 (2000).
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appointees populate advisory committees with ideologically sympathetic experts
and then use those panels as counterweights to the career bureaucracy.
In Part III, we evaluate various theories of advisory committees through a series of empirical tests. We first leverage data on campaign contributions made by
more than one thousand randomly selected individuals serving on advisory committees in order to estimate the ideological preferences of advisory committee
members. We find that committee members’ views tend to track those of the party
that controls the White House, not the views of current lawmakers or of the
Congress that created the committee. We go on to examine the formation, funding, and activities of advisory committees across sixteen cabinet-level agencies
over two decades. We find strong evidence that political appointees across administrations utilize advisory committees as counterweights to the career bureaucracy. Agency heads in Republican administrations are more likely to convene
policy-focused advisory committees when the civil servants at their agencies
trend more liberal. Agency heads in Democratic administrations are more likely
to convene policy-focused advisory committees when the civil servants at their
agencies lean to the right. These results suggest that agency heads use advisory
committees to pull in outside expertise when career civil servants within their
agencies are less sympathetic to the administration’s agenda. In other words, political appointees turn to the shallow state when the deep state is inhospitable to
their aims.
We supplement our quantitative analysis in Part III with qualitative case studies in Part IV. We examine four advisory committees advising four separate agencies under four different Presidents. In all four cases, political appointees turned
to advisory committees to counterbalance career staff. In two of those cases (the
Pentagon’s Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services under
President Clinton and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Advisory
Committee on Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention under President George W.
Bush), the counterweight proved successful, allowing political appointees to
implement their agenda over the opposition of careerists. In a third case (the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Advisory Committee on Family
Residential Centers under President Obama), the deep state struck back, thwarting the advisory committee’s efforts at reform. In the fourth case (the
Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee
under President Trump), the final chapter in the struggle between the deep state
and the shallow state has yet to be written.26
We end in Part V by considering the implications of our empirical findings for
separation-of-powers accounts of advisory committees. Our results cast doubt on
the notion that advisory committees—whose composition tends to track the partisan preferences of the President rather than of Congress—enhance legislative
control over agencies. We suggest that more specific membership criteria—such
26. See Jean Chemnick, Trump’s Changes to Science Might Not Last, E&E NEWS (July 22, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060771339 [https://perma.cc/D6VN-XE4N].
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as partisan balance requirements—may increase the likelihood that advisory
committees will assist Congress in its exercise of oversight functions. Our results
also (at least partially) allay concerns about congressional aggrandizement
through control over advisory committees. FACA does not appear to have prevented Presidents and their appointees from surrounding themselves with advisers who share their views.
The implications for judicial review of agency action are more nuanced. On
the one hand, our findings might be seen to counsel in favor of judicial deference
to agencies on science-related matters when the agency’s scientific conclusions
are affirmed by an expert advisory committee. Advisory committees, we find, are
often used as counterweights to career civil servants; when advisory committees
and civil servants agree, that may be a strong sign of reasonableness. On the other
hand, predictable partisan changes in advisory committee composition may call
into question whether these panels should be viewed as neutral arbiters of scientific fact.
Finally, and most significantly, our findings speak to a long-running debate
about intra-executive branch checks on administrative power—sometimes
referred to as the “internal” or “new” separation of powers27—and what it means
for the legitimacy of the administrative state. Some celebrate the power of the
civil service as an important check on executive overreach;28 others lament the
ability of unelected careerists to stymie the agenda of a democratically accountable administration.29 Our results should cause both sides of this debate to update
their positions. On one hand, the check exerted by career civil servants may not
be as robust as celebrants of “internal separation” suggest. Our findings indicate
that agency heads have access to a broad network of advisory committees that
can provide them with alternative viewpoints and expert knowledge, thereby balancing the influence of career civil servants. On the other hand, and for the same
reason, those who worry about the outsized influence of career civil servants may
27. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317 (2006); Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians
and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227,
229 (2016). These terms stand in contradistinction to the “external” separation of powers—all extraexecutive checks on that branch, including not only Congress and the courts, but also, inter alia, media
and civil society organizations and “old” separation of powers, that is, legislative-executive–judicial
interactions. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship between Internal and External
Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J 423, 425 (2009) (defining the external separation of powers);
Michaels, supra, at 229 (defining the old separation of powers).
28. See, e.g., JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 16 (2017) (stating that “mid-twentieth-century administrative lawyers redeemed
[the framers’] constitutional commitment to separating and checking State powers—and did so by
triangulating administrative power among . . . politically insulated civil servants” and two other groups
within administration); Katyal, supra note 27.
29. See, e.g., DONALD J. DEVINE, REFORMING THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY: CHALLENGE AND
OPPORTUNITY 10 (2018), https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-12/BG3357_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PK6K-Q9SQ]; Jason Richwine, When Bureaucrats Veto the President, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 19,
2019, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/02/bureaucrats-civil-service-veto-presidentialpolicies [https://perma.cc/G82P-SLH2].
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find that their concerns are allayed—at least somewhat—by the check that advisory committees offer. The shallow state, by serving as a counterweight to the
deep state, may also help to legitimize it.
I. THE LAW OF FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES
Presidents and their Cabinet members have convened committees of outside
experts to assist in the formulation and implementation of policy since the early
days of the Republic. George Washington’s appointment of a three-person, ad
hoc commission to negotiate an end to the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794 is sometimes cited as the first such instance.30 Since then, panels of outside experts—or
panels composed of a mix of government officials and private citizens—have
played important roles at critical historical junctures, including the Roberts
Commission that investigated the Pearl Harbor attacks, the Warren Commission
that probed the assassination of President Kennedy, and the Kerner Commission
that investigated the race riots of the 1960s.31
Congress has sought to assert control over the formation, composition, and
operations of advisory committees at various points. When President John Tyler
convened a three-member commission to investigate claims of corruption in the
New York customs house, Congress quickly responded with a statute prohibiting
the payment of any account or charge “growing out of, or in any way connected
with, any commission or inquiry” in the absence of a special appropriation.32
After President Theodore Roosevelt created an expert panel to provide artistic
and architectural advice on future federal building plans, Congress in 1909 passed
another statute barring public funds from being used for any “commission, council, board, or other similar body” unless “authorized by law.”33
Notwithstanding these funding restrictions, advisory committees flourished
across the Executive Branch throughout the early and middle parts of the twentieth century. By 1970, the House Committee on Government Oversight estimated
that more than 1,800 advisory bodies reported to the President, his executive
departments, and other federal agencies, with more than 20,000 members and
operating costs of approximately $75 million (or roughly $500 million adjusted
for inflation).34 Members of Congress sounded alarm that these committees had

30. Bybee, supra note 14, at 60 n.35; see also WENDY R. GINSBERG, CONG. RES. SERV., R40520,
FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2009).
31. See Bybee, supra note 14, at 56.
32. Act of Aug. 26, 1842, ch. 202, § 25, 5 Stat. 523, 533 (exempting military courts martial and
courts of inquiry from the ban); see also Bybee, supra note 14, at 61–63.
33. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 299. § 9, 5 Stat. 1027 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1346
(2012)). The 1909 statute also blocked the use of federal dollars to pay the salaries of executive branch
officers or employees detailed to unauthorized commissions, councils, and boards. See id.; see also
Bybee, supra note 14, at 63–65.
34. FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT (PUBLIC LAW 92-463): SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 214, 227–28 (Comm. Print 1978) (Virginia A. McMurtry ed.,
Cong. Research Serv.) [hereinafter FACA Sourcebook] (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 91-1731 (1970), in S.
COMM. ON ENERGY, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES, 95TH CONG).
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come to constitute a “fifth branch of [g]overnment,” alongside the Legislature,
Executive, Judiciary, and independent regulatory commissions.35
Congress responded to these concerns in 1972 with the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (FACA), a sweeping statute that functions as the legal framework
for the “fifth branch.” FACA applies to the operations of virtually every body
within the Executive Branch that includes at least one member from outside of
the federal government—whether the body was constituted by Congress or by an
executive branch actor.36 FACA’s stated purpose is to bring order to what its
drafters saw as a vast collection of committees with duplicative or irrelevant missions and with insufficient public disclosure.37
Much of FACA is focused on making the activities of advisory committees
more transparent to Congress and to the public. When an agency forms an advisory committee, it must publish a notice in the Federal Register and file a detailed
charter with the Library of Congress and with Senate and House standing committees that have jurisdiction over the agency.38 Advisory committee meetings
must be open to the public,39 with advance notice of meetings published in the
Federal Register,40 and “[i]nterested persons” must have an opportunity to appear
before or file statements with the committee.41 Committees must keep “[d]etailed
minutes” of all of their meetings and must make those minutes—along with other
committee documents—available for public inspection (subject to certain exemptions set forth in the Freedom of Information Act).42 Agencies must maintain financial records of committee-related expenditures, which the Comptroller
General—an official answerable to Congress—can audit.43
FACA also regulates the appointment of advisory committee members and the
duration of committees’ existence. Section 5(b)(2) provides that the membership
of advisory committees must be “fairly balanced in terms of the points of view
represented and the functions” they perform.44 For some committees, Congress
35. See id. at 259 (quoting 117 CONG. REC. 2750 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1971) (statement of Rep. John
Monagan)); see also id. at 299 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. H4282 (daily ed. May 9, 1972) (statement of
Rep. Bud Brown)).
36. FACA, 5 U.S.C app. § 3(2) (1972). Two specific committees are exempted by name from
FACA’s requirements: The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and the Commission
on Government Procurement. Id.
37. Id. § 2(b).
38. Id. § 9. The Federal Register requirement does not apply to committees formed by the president.
Presidential advisory committees must file their charters with the General Services Administration and
the Library of Congress but not any House or Senate committee. See id.
39. Id. § 10(a)(1).
40. Id. § 10(a)(2) (stating exception when “President determines otherwise for reasons of national
security”).
41. Id. § 10(a)(3).
42. Id. § 10(b)–(d). For exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
43. 5 U.S.C app. § 12. On the Comptroller General’s status as an officer of the Legislative Branch,
see Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730–32 (1986).
44. 5 U.S.C app. § 5(b)(2). For an overview of legislative, judicial, and administrative interpretations
of the fair balance requirement, see generally Mark B. Brown, Fairly Balanced: The Politics of
Representation on Government Advisory Committees, 61 POL. RES. Q. 547 (2008). Mark Petracca
provides an early empirical examination of the interest-group composition—but not the ideological
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has added further representation requirements in separate statutes. For example,
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 requires Occupational Safety
and Health Administration advisory committees to include equal representation
of employer and worker interests.45 Other statutory membership criteria are more
specific. For example, five of the ten members on the advisory committee counseling the Interior Secretary regarding the 200,000-acre Dominguez–Escalante
National Conservation Area in western Colorado must “reside in, or within reasonable proximity to, Mesa County, Delta County, or Montrose County.”46 All
committees must be reestablished or renewed every two years—which effectively
sets members’ terms at that same length—unless a statute provides otherwise.47
The statute casts a wide net, defining “advisory committee” as essentially any
group created by statute or “established or utilized” by the President or any
agency or officer so long as the group meets two additional conditions: (1) it was
established or utilized “in the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations”
for the President or federal agencies or officers; and (2) it has at least one member
who is not a full-time or permanent part-time federal officer or employee.48
Subsequent court decisions have restricted that definition somewhat. In the 1989
case Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, the Supreme Court
held that the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on the Federal
Judiciary fell outside FACA’s scope, notwithstanding the Court’s acknowledgement that the Executive Branch “no doubt . . . ‘utilizes’ [the ABA committee] in
one common sense of the term” when selecting judicial nominees.49 Based primarily on the statute’s legislative history, the Court in Public Citizen concluded
that FACA applies only to advisory committees that are “formed”—and not
merely “utilized”—by the federal government or by “quasi-public organizations
such as the National Academy of Sciences ‘for’ public agencies.”50 Then, in the
2005 case In re Cheney, which involved an energy policy task force headed by
the then-Vice President, the D.C. Circuit held that a panel advising the President
may include nonfederal employees in its meetings without becoming subject to
composition—of advisory committee members in FACA’s first five years. Mark P. Petracca, Federal
Advisory Committees, Interest Groups, and the Administrative State, 13 CONG. & THE PRESIDENCY 83,
96–98 (1986) (examining select executive departments). Kevin Karty examines interest group
representation––but again, not ideology––on advisory committees for one year (1998). Karty, supra
note 5, at 217 fig.2. In a thoughtful and thought-provoking student note, Daniel Walters suggests that
courts should interpret FACA’s fair balance requirement not as “representational” balancing of
members from various interest groups, but instead as “look[ing] to the robustness of the process of
deliberation in advisory committees.” Daniel E. Walters, Note, The Justiciability of Fair Balance Under
the Federal Advisory Committee Act: Toward a Deliberative Process Approach, 110 MICH. L. REV. 677,
681–82 (2012).
45. Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 7(b), 84 Stat. 1590, 1598
(1970).
46. 16 U.S.C. § 460zzz-6(d)(5) (2006).
47. 5 U.S.C. app. § 14(a).
48. Id. § 3(2). Advisory committees established by certain intelligence agencies or the Federal
Reserve System, as well as several specifically named committees, are exempted. Id. §§ 3(2)(C), 4(b).
49. 491 U.S. 440, 452 (1989).
50. Id. at 461–62.
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FACA so long as the nonfederal employees never exercise a “right to vote or
veto” during deliberations.51
Some scholars and judges (and at least one scholar-turned-judge) have
expressed unease with the statutory framework for advisory committees, especially as applied to panels that advise the President directly. Justice Kennedy,
concurring in the Public Citizen case, wrote that the application of FACA to a
committee advising the President on judicial appointees “encroaches upon a
power that the text of the Constitution commits in explicit terms to the
President.”52 (One wonders whether he might have reached a similar conclusion
regarding FACA’s application to committees advising the President on nonappointments matters as well.) Then-law professor and now-Ninth Circuit Judge
Jay Bybee expanded on Justice Kennedy’s concerns in a Yale Law Journal article
five years after the Public Citizen decision. According to Bybee, “FACA violates
the separation of powers to the extent that it regulates the President’s use of outside advisory committees funded at their own expense.”53 Judge A. Raymond
Randolph of the D.C. Circuit echoed Bybee’s analysis in the first round of the
Cheney litigation. “As applied to committees the President establishes to give
him advice, FACA has for many years teetered on the edge of constitutionality.”54 We return to the concerns voiced by Justice Kennedy, Judge Bybee, and
Judge Randolph in Part V. The key point for now is that FACA has survived, and
the narrowing interpretations in Public Citizen and Cheney have circumscribed
its scope only slightly.
Advisory committees are thriving under FACA’s legal framework. At last
count, fifty-three executive agencies and independent regulatory commissions
maintained active advisory committees.55 The total number of active committees
numbered 1,019 in fiscal year 2017, with 77,614 members in all.56 Of these, about
three-fifths were statutorily mandated,57 and the remaining were created by agencies themselves,58 with the exception of forty-four panels formed by presidential
directive.59 In that fiscal year, these committees held 7,885 meetings and issued
630 reports.60 All in all, the federal government expended about $380 million on
advisory committee activities.61 A majority of those funds (fifty-seven percent)
51. 406 F.3d 723, 728 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
52. Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 482 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
53. Bybee, supra note 14, at 128.
54. In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J., dissenting).
55. See All Agency Accounts, FACA DATABASE, https://www.facadatabase.gov/FACA/FACA
PublicAgencyNavigation [https://perma.cc/Y67J-MZBE] (last visited Mar. 3, 2020).
56. FACA DATABASE, supra note 1.
57. Id.; see, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1011c(a) (2012) (establishing “in the Department [of Education] a
National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity . . . to assess the process of
accreditation and the institutional eligibility and certification of institutions of higher education”).
58. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., DEPARTMENTAL REG. NO. 1043-37 (2005) (establishing an
advisory committee regarding a forest management plan within the spotted owl’s habitat).
59. See FACA DATABASE, supra note 1.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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went to compensate federal members and staff for their time, but the federal government also spent nearly $54 million on member travel and per diem expenses
and approximately $37 million in honoraria to committee members.62
These committees tend to comprise a mix of members from the for-profit and
nonprofit sectors, with many committees—particularly those addressing resource
management issues or programs that require intergovernmental coordination—
also including state and local governmental employees. The Office of Financial
Research Advisory Committee, which supplies economic analysis to that office,
which in turn advises the Financial Stability Oversight Council,63 is illustrative.
Approximately half of that committee’s members hail from financial firms or
related entities, with the other half consisting of academics, think-tank researchers, and former government officials.64
The number of committees that fall within FACA’s ambit has remained relatively stable year to year, with a small overall upward trend over the past two decades. Committee membership size and activities also have exhibited similar
trends over time.65 All the while, a small but active literature on advisory committees and the separation of powers has emerged. We summarize that literature in
the next Part.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
A. EXISTING FRAMEWORKS

A number of scholars have sought to characterize the relationship between advisory committees and other elements of the federal government. Attempts to
situate advisory committees vis-à-vis the three constitutional branches of government can be categorized—coarsely—by the branch to which they relate. In this
section, we consider accounts that emphasize the relationships between advisory
committees and the Legislative Branch (Article I), the Executive Branch (Article
II), the Judiciary (Article III), and the web of administrative agencies sometimes
dubbed the “fourth branch.”66
1. Advisory Committees and Congress
A number of accounts highlight the role of advisory committees as tools of
congressional control over administrative agencies. These congressional-control
accounts build on the foundational work of political scientist Matthew
McCubbins and his collaborators. In a much-cited 1984 article, McCubbins and
62. Id.
63. See 12 U.S.C. § 5342 (2012).
64. For biographies of committee members, see Committee Members, OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH
ADVISORY COMM. (2019), https://www.financialresearch.gov/frac/frac-member-biographies/ [https://
perma.cc/7J53-H3R9].
65. For data on the number, size, and activities of federal advisory committees, see FACA Database
Downloadable Datasets, FACA DATABASE, https://www.facadatabase.gov/FACA/apex/FACADatasets
(last visited Oct. 13, 2019).
66. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578 (1984).
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Thomas Schwartz observed that lawmakers have two techniques of oversight
available to them: “police patrols” and “fire alarms.” Police-patrol oversight is
“comparatively centralized, active, and direct”: members of Congress review
materials, commission studies, conduct field observations, and hold oversight
hearings “with the aim of detecting and remedying any violations of legislative
goals.”67 Fire-alarm oversight is “less centralized” and “less active and direct”:
Congress establishes institutions that enable citizens and interest groups to monitor agencies, challenge them in court, and alert lawmakers when they have
strayed from their charges. “Instead of sniffing for fires,” McCubbins and
Schwartz write, “Congress places fire-alarm boxes on street corners, builds neighborhood fire houses, and sometimes dispatches its own hook-and-ladder in
response to an alarm.”68 Whereas police patrols are costly and time-consuming,
fire alarms allow lawmakers to outsource oversight costs to individual citizens,
organized interest groups, and courts.
In later work, McCubbins and collaborators Roger Noll and Barry Weingast
add to the “police patrol” and “fire alarm” models a third approach to congressional control over agencies: “deck-stacking.”69 They suggest that lawmakers
design agencies to “stack the deck in favor of constituents who are the intended
beneficiaries of the bargain struck by the coalition which created the agency.”70
When it succeeds, deck-stacking can be even more cost-effective than fire-alarm
oversight, because it does not require lawmakers “to monitor, or even be aware
of, the nature of the agency’s actions.”71 Instead, lawmakers who engage in
“deck-stacking” seek to “create a decisionmaking environment” inside the
agency that “mirrors the political circumstances” that gave rise to the agency’s
creation of the relevant program’s adoption.72
Advisory committees can potentially serve “fire-alarm” and “deck-stacking”
purposes.73 Political scientists Steven Balla and John Wright have explored the
extent to which advisory committees fulfill both functions. In a 2000 book chapter, they proposed that “advisory committees can facilitate oversight by reducing
the information asymmetry between Congress and bureaucratic agencies.”74
More specifically, advisory committees “provide competing interest groups with

67. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
68. Id.
69. See Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L., ECON., & ORG. 243, 261 (1987).
70. Id.
71. Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics
and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431,
432 (1989).
72. Id. at 444.
73. Advisory committees are thus an alternative to “police patrols,” which entail centralized
oversight by congressmembers and their staffs. See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 67, at 166
(defining “police patrols”).
74. Balla & Wright, Can Advisory Committees, supra note 13, at 184.
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institutionalized access to agency policy making.”75 In the terminology of
McCubbins and Schwartz, advisory committees place interest group members in
positions where they can sound the fire alarm when agencies deviate from their
statutory mandates. Balla and Wright note, though, that advisory committees can
only serve this facilitative function when two conditions are met: (1) “committees
must be heterogeneous in their composition,” and (2) “committee members must
have access to agency information.”76 Because agency heads can choose advisory
committee members and agency officials can regulate access to information,
agencies play an important role in determining whether advisory committees operate as useful instruments of oversight.77
Balla and Wright modify and expand upon this account in an influential 2001
article.78 There, they place less weight on the role of advisory committees as fire
alarms and more emphasis on advisory committees as tools for deck-stacking.
According to the latter view, lawmakers establish committees that reflect the
preferences of the legislative coalition that created the relevant agency or program.79 That symmetry between interest groups involved in the debate over an
agency or program’s genesis and the membership of an associated advisory committee helps ensure that members of the enacting coalition continue to have a seat
at the table throughout the implementation process.80
Importantly, the deck-stacking model characterizes committees not as instruments of the current members of Congress, but rather as a means for a past
Congress to project its influence into the future.81 One way that an enacting coalition can accomplish this projection goal, according to Balla and Wright, is to
require the representation of specific outside interests on certain committees.82
Balla and Wright use as their principal example the fifteen-member National
Drinking Water Advisory Council, created by the Safe Drinking Water Act of
1974 to advise the EPA. The 1974 law mandates that five members of the committee be members of “the general public”; that five members come from state
and local water-safety agencies; and that five members represent private organizations with “an active interest in the field of water hygiene and public water supply.”83 Analyzing appointments to the panel from 1995 to 1997, Balla and Wright
conclude that the committee’s composition “is broadly representative of the range
of interests that were active in the legislative debate over the Safe Drinking
Water Act.”84

75. Id. at 172–73.
76. Id. at 173.
77. See id. at 184.
78. Balla & Wright, Interest Groups, supra note 13.
79. Id. at 800.
80. Id. at 799–800.
81. See id. at 801.
82. See id. at 803–04.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-5(a) (2018). Two members of the third group must be “associated with small,
rural public water systems.” Id.
84. Balla & Wright, Interest Groups, supra note 13, at 810–11.
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Although the “fire-alarm” and “deck-stacking” accounts no doubt contain elements of truth, these accounts are—as their primary exponents acknowledge—
incomplete. Balla and Wright state that their account applies only to committees
created by Congress’s own hand, not to those established by Presidents and agencies.85 In fiscal year 2017, that would leave more than 400 committees that are
not statutorily mandated—or more than two-fifths of all advisory committees in
that year—expressly outside of the scope of the “fire-alarm” and “deck-stacking”
accounts.86
Further, the “controls” that the Legislative Branch places on congressionally
created advisory committees often are elastic. Recall that FACA itself requires
only that membership rosters be “fairly balanced in terms of the points of view
represented and the functions to be performed”87—a standard that leaves agency
heads with ample wiggle room to choose individuals of their liking. And even
when Congress imposes more specific stipulations on advisory committee composition, agencies still enjoy wide latitude to choose panel members. Consider
again the fifteen-member drinking water committee that Balla and Wright use as
an example of congressional control. Members must be drawn from “the general
public”; state and local water-safety agencies; and private organizations with “an
active interest in the field of water hygiene and public water supply.”88 We suspect that a savvy agency head could locate members of the general public, public
water commissioners, and members of water-related organizations—including
conservation groups; associations representing industry and agriculture; and
everything in between—that hold virtually any conceivable view on water
safety.89 Restrictions of this magnitude serve as devices of congressional control
only in a loose sense. Accordingly, accounts that place Congress in the driver’s
seat tell only part of the story.
2. Advisory Committees and the Executive
A second perspective on advisory committees emphasizes the relationship
between these panels and the Executive Branch. As then-Professor Bybee noted,
presidents and their administrations historically have relied on advisory committees for a number of purposes. The “obvious and publicly invoked justification” is
85. Balla & Wright, Can Advisory Committees, supra note 13, at 168–69; Balla & Wright, Interest
Groups, supra note 13, at 802. The authors add that committees established via mechanisms other than
statutory enactment “undoubtedly serve a variety of different purposes.” Balla & Wright, Interest
Groups, supra note 13, at 802.
86. See FACA DATABASE, supra note 1. These committees were created by executive branch organs,
either pursuant to congressional authorization or sua sponte. See id.
87. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2) (2018).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-5(a). Two members of the third group must be “associated with small, rural
public water systems.” Id.
89. For example, one of the most recent appointees to the National Drinking Water Advisory Council—
evidently as a representative of the “general public”—is a senior vice president and general counsel at a cast
iron manufacturing company that has been the subject of several criminal prosecutions for environmental
offenses in recent years. See Sarah Okeson, Polluter’s Friend Stalls on Protecting Public Water Supply,
DCREPORT.ORG (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.dcreport.org/2019/03/14/polluters-friend-stalls-on-protectingpublic-water-supplies/ [https://perma.cc/RLD2-SM9H].
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“for information or advice, which the committees can provide at relatively little cost
to the government.”90 A second function of advisory committees is to “legitimize” executive branch policies. Incorporating interest groups into the decisionmaking process
by placing their representatives on advisory committees may neutralize potential
opposition to administration policies, and the endorsement of a broadly representative
advisory committee may “show the support of the key parties that will be affected.”91
Advisory committees also may serve “purely political ends” such as “masking the
government’s unwillingness to act.”92 Other scholars echo Bybee’s account of the
ways in which Presidents and their administrations utilize these panels.93
Bybee believes that advisory committees have served all of these functions in
the past, but he worries that FACA now undermines the ability of the Executive
Branch—and in particular, the President—to make use of advisory committees.
“FACA’s requirements that advisory committees have a balanced viewpoint,
open their records to public inspection, and open their meetings to public participation increase the cost of using advisory committees, and suggest that presidents
will rely less frequently on advisory committees,” Bybee writes.94 He concedes
that “[t]he empirical evidence for this proposition is admittedly anecdotal,”
though he notes that the American Bar Association committee at issue in Public
Citizen said that it would no longer provide advice on judicial nominations if
required to abide by FACA.95 He also worries that FACA’s open-meeting and
public-inspection requirements will discourage advisory committee members
from providing the Executive Branch with their “full and frank views.”96
Although Bybee argues that FACA’s constraints on presidential adviceseeking amount to unconstitutional “aggrandizement” of congressional power at
the Executive’s expense, he is careful to limit the scope of his constitutional argument: “Any claim the President can make probably does not include the hundreds
of advisory committees that are agency-established.”97 He adds that application

90. Bybee, supra note 14, at 58.
91. Id. at 58–59.
92. Id. at 59. Bybee notes that establishing a committee may
help the government give the public the impression that something is being done, while it
avoids having to take action. Thus, the appointment of a committee buys the decisionmaker
time and defuses a politically troublesome matter by deferring it until it fades from the public’s memory or more immediate concerns subsume it.
Id.
93. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 14, at 120 (suggesting that Presidents use advisory committees in
the national security domain “to gain leverage over the legislature by mobilizing public support”); Amy
B. Zegart, Blue Ribbons, Black Boxes: Toward a Better Understanding of Presidential Commissions, 34
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 366, 374–76 (2004) (focusing on advisory committees convened by the
President and positing that their primary functions are to “generate mass public attention and support for
the president’s policies”; to “provid[e] new ideas, new facts, and new analysis” to executive branch
officials; and to “alter the constellation of political opposition”).
94. Bybee, supra note 14, at 125.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 124.
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of FACA to “the bulk of congressionally created advisory committees” is also constitutionally unproblematic,98 though the concern that open-meeting mandates might
dissuade members from offering their unvarnished views would seem to apply to
those panels as well. We return to these issues in Part V, where—armed with evidence from our quantitative and qualitative analyses—we will be better positioned
to assess FACA’s effects on Executive Branch control over advisory committees.
3. Advisory Committees and the Judiciary
In addition to their functions as congressional agents and Executive Branch
auxiliaries, advisory committees play a potentially important—though
“undertheorized”99—role in judicial review of agency action. This issue most
often arises in cases involving section 706 of the Administrative Procedure
Act, which (among other things) instructs courts to set aside agency action
that is “arbitrary” or “capricious.”100 In some cases, courts explicitly rely on
an advisory committee’s conclusions in deciding whether agency action satisfies the Act’s reasonableness requirements.101 In other cases, courts will cite
an agency’s decision to disregard an advisory committee recommendation as
evidence that the agency action is “arbitrary and capricious.”102 But judicial
treatment of advisory-committee conclusions is not uniform, and in other
cases courts give little weight to an advisory committee’s view.103
Two prominent scholars have separately argued that advisory committees’
views should figure more prominently in judicial review of agency actions.
Sheila Jasanoff, in the conclusion to her thorough examination of scientific advisory committees at the EPA and FDA, argues that courts should “adopt a highly
deferential posture” to agency actions when an advisory committee composed of
scientists supports the agency’s findings.104 “It is not very likely, after all, that a
98. Id.
99. Adrian Vermeule, The Parliament of the Experts, 58 DUKE L.J. 2231, 2236 (2009).
100. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2018).
101. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 378–79 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing
Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee’s recommendation in upholding EPA’s primary national
ambient air quality standard for ozone); British Am. Commodity Options Corp. v. Bagley, 552 F.2d 482,
490 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing recommendation of the Advisory Committee on the Definition and Regulation
of Market Instruments in upholding Commodity Futures Trading Commission rule). Note that in
American Trucking, the relevant judicial review provision came from the Clean Air Act, not the
Administrative Procedure Act, though the court emphasized that the same standard applies in both
contexts. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 283 F.3d at 362.
102. See, e.g., New York v. Dep’t of Commerce, 315 F. Supp. 3d 766, 808 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding
the Department of Commerce “ignor[ed] the recommendation of the . . . advisory committee); Tummino
v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp. 2d 212, 233–34 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding the FDA’s decisionmaking
processes unusual when they do not follow advisory committee’s recommendation).
103. See, e.g., Am. Great Lakes Ports Ass’n v. Zukunft, 296 F. Supp. 3d 27, 48 (D.D.C. 2017)
(finding that the Coast Guard’s adoption of a ten percent adjustment to rates that international shippers
must pay to American maritime pilots on the Great Lakes was not a product of reasoned decisionmaking
because “there is no evidence that the Coast Guard or its sources at the [Great Lakes Pilotage Advisory
Committee] ever relied on any relevant or creditable methodological evidence whatsoever in arriving at
this figure”).
104. JASANOFF, supra note 5, at 249.
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technically illiterate judiciary will detect flaws in scientific reasoning that has already been examined by a competent expert body,” Professor Jasanoff observes.105
She adds that “close judicial scrutiny” of the science underlying agency action
may be warranted when the agency and its scientific advisers disagree or when
“there is evidence of procedural impropriety in the review process.”106
Adrian Vermeule has proposed an even more influential role for scientific advisory committees and other expert panels in judicial review of agency action. In
Professor Vermeule’s view, “[a]gencies should not be permitted to depart from
the findings of expert panels unless they can give a valid second-order reason to
think that the consensus or majority view of experts as to matters of fact is not
epistemically reliable.”107 A valid second-order reason might be, for example,
“that the panel’s composition made it inadequately diverse.”108 Simply disagreeing with the experts’ substantive conclusions would not suffice.
Both Jasanoff and Vermeule propose roles for expert advisory committees that
would relieve the epistemic burden on judges in cases involving challenges to
agencies’ scientific conclusions. Under her proposal, Jasanoff writes, “the spectacle of courts immersing themselves in technical data may gradually become
as much an artifact as aggressive judicial overruling of congressional enactments
became in the aftermath of the New Deal.”109 In this respect, advisory committees
would become aides and guides to the judicial branch. Importantly, Jasanoff’s
and Vermeule’s arguments apply to a subset of advisory committees—those that
provide “scientific advice”110 or “expertise”111—though the boundaries around
those categories are likely to be blurred and contested. Their theories are, moreover, explicitly normative accounts of the role that advisory committees should
play in judicial review, rather than descriptive claims about the roles that advisory
committees currently occupy.
4. Advisory Committees and the Bureaucracy
A fourth perspective on advisory committees suggests that agencies use these
panels to serve particular bureaucratic interests. Like the executive-focused account,
the bureaucratic account emphasizes that advisory committees can be used to gather
information from experts and stakeholders and to facilitate buy-in from outside
groups involved in policy implementation.112 The posited goal, however, is not to
advance the administration’s agenda but to further the agency’s own objectives.113
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Vermeule, supra note 99, at 2235.
108. Id. at 2275.
109. JASANOFF, supra note 5, at 249.
110. Id. at 248–49.
111. Vermeule, supra note 99, at 2234.
112. Moffitt, supra note 15, at 880.
113. See Lavertu & Weimer, supra note 15, at 215 (building on a model in which the agency’s
“driving motivation is to protect its reputation”); Moffitt, supra note 15, at 881 (arguing that “agencies
can use transparency procedures, such as federal advisory committees, to enhance and protect agency
reputation”).
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Two simultaneously published studies—both focused on the FDA’s use of advisory committees when deciding whether to approve pharmaceuticals and medical devices—offer agency-centered theories of advisory committee activity. Both
suggest that the FDA utilizes advisory committees to reduce the risk of—and fallout from—costly regulatory errors. Susan Moffitt posits that advisory committees
serve to insure the FDA against risks generated by “implementers outside the
agency”—the pharmaceutical companies that market a drug, the doctors who prescribe it, and the patients who use it as (or not as) prescribed. According to
Professor Moffitt, advisory committees can publicize the risk and uncertainty associated with a new drug and to “diffus[e] blame for policy failures away from the
agency.”114 Moffitt’s empirical analysis reveals that the FDA’s use of advisory
committees is “systematically associated with a chief concern among reputationminded bureaucrats: avoiding a Congressional oversight hearing at which the
bureaucrats must publicly defend and explain ostensible agency failures.”115
Stéphane Lavertu and David Weimer likewise argue that advisory committees
supply the FDA with “political cover” when the “stakes of its decisions are
high.”116 They also emphasize the role of advisory committees in helping
the FDA overcome resource constraints.117 Advisory committees, they note, provide the FDA with extra “information-processing capacity” when the agency
lacks the budget and expertise to synthesize data itself.118
These bureaucracy-focused accounts overlap with the executive-focused
accounts discussed above.119 All agencies—including the so-called “independent
regulatory commissions”—are formally part of the Executive Branch and thus to
some degree under the aegis of the President.120 We treat these accounts separately
because, as we seek to show, the interests of the President and those of bureaucrats
do not necessarily align. Indeed, as we will argue, preference divergence between
the presidential administration and the federal bureaucracy potentially plays an
important role in the formation and function of advisory committees.
B. A NEW THEORY OF THE FIFTH BRANCH

Existing theoretical frameworks no doubt capture important aspects of advisorycommittee activity and the interactions between these panels and the branches. Yet,
as we note above, we think these accounts omit much as well. Accounts that position
advisory committees as instruments of Congress—either as “fire-alarm” monitors or
as “deck-stacking” tools—explicitly leave out nearly half of all committees, and
they fail to make sense of the loose restrictions that Congress imposes on the advisory committees that it creates by statute. Accounts focused on executive-branch
114. Moffitt, supra note 15, at 888, 891.
115. Id. at 889.
116. Lavertu & Weimer, supra note 15, at 227, 231.
117. Id. at 215, 231.
118. Id. at 233.
119. See supra Section II.A.2.
120. The FDA, moreover, is not an independent regulatory commission but an agency within the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
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uses of advisory committees tend to view the Executive Branch as unitary, overlooking the substantial diversity of preferences and incentives among Executive Branch
actors. A similar criticism applies to bureaucracy-focused accounts, which (correctly) highlight the ways in which committees can serve particular bureaucratic
interests, but fail to open up the “black box of the agency”121 to reveal the divergence of interests within it. Accounts focused on the role of advisory committees in
judicial review of agency action—persuasive or not—operate primarily on a different plane: as normative arguments about how government actors ought to use advisory committees rather than as descriptive models of how they actually do.
Our search for a new model is motivated by the recognition that the Executive
Branch as a whole and its component agencies—like Congress in Kenneth
Shepsle’s famous formulation—constitute a “they” rather than an “it.”122 At the
helm of each agency are one or more political appointees who are chosen, in part,
to translate the President’s ideological preferences and political objectives into
concrete policies.123 But, though regulations often are highly technical, agency
heads typically are generalists.124 As a consequence, they must rely on others for
specialized information and advice.125
An obvious source for this information—indeed, an intended source—is the
civil service.126 According to Jennifer Nou, “in many ways, high-quality information is the bureaucracy’s raison d’eˆtre.”127 As Christopher Lu, who served as
Deputy Secretary of Labor during the Obama Administration, characterized the
arrangement: “The politicals set the direction of the agency, but they can only do
it effectively if they tap into the expertise of the federal civil service.”128

121. Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 488 (2002); Strauss, supra note 17, at 155.
122. See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 254 (1992) (arguing against legislative intent as a useful tool
of statutory interpretation because “[i]ndividuals have intentions and purpose and motives; collections
of individuals do not”).
123. Although the extent of presidential direction of agency heads is in dispute, administrative law
scholars at least agree that the President provides political oversight. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss,
Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 697,
703 (2007).
124. See Jennifer Nou, Subdelegating Powers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 484 (2017).
125. Id.
126. We use the term “civil service” to refer to career federal employees—other than uniformed
servicemembers—who are not political appointees. Political appointees fall into three general
categories. The first and most familiar category covers positions filled by presidential appointment with
Senate confirmation (PAS). The second category is “Schedule C” positions. The third category
comprises political appointees in the Senior Executive Service (capped at ten percent of all Senior
Executive Service posts). See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency
Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 925–27 (2008). See generally JON O. SHIMABUKURO & JENNIFER A.
STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45635, CATEGORIES OF FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYMENT: A
SNAPSHOT (Mar. 26, 2019) (reviewing the categories of federal service employment).
127. See Nou, supra note 124, at 487.
128. Charles S. Clark, Deconstructing the Deep State, GOV’T EXEC., http://www.govexec.com/
feature/gov-exec-deconstructing-deep-state/?oref=special-reports [https://perma.cc/LU88-VPNU] (last
visited Mar. 5, 2020).
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That arrangement may have worked well for Deputy Secretary Lu, a
Democratic appointee to a cabinet department whose employees lean left.129 But
what about for an appointee at loggerheads with her department’s workforce—or
even one with designs to demolish that department?130 Here, it is far from clear
that civil servants will implement the agency head’s agenda.131 Instead, the prospect of shirking—that is, that an agent will undertake action (or inaction) that is
contrary to the principal’s objective or desired effort level—looms large.132 This
concern is particularly acute in the federal government, where civil service protections limit appointees’ ability to fire unfaithful agents.133
The conventional wisdom holds that the federal civil service leans left,134 and so
bureaucratic resistance will be more of a problem for conservative Republican
administrations than for liberal Democratic ones. Although that may be true in gross,
129. See Joshua D. Clinton et al., Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology of Agencies,
Presidents, and Congress, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 341, 348 fig.3 (2012) (reporting preference estimates for
executive departments and independent agencies).
130. See, e.g., Evan Halper, Rick Perry Wanted to Eliminate the Department of Energy; Now He Is
Said to Be Trump’s Pick to Run It, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016, 12:45 PM), https://www.latimes.com/
politics/la-na-pol-trump-perry-20161213-story.html; David Lazarus, For Trump’s Man at Consumer
Agency, Emphasis Is on Ditching Rules, Not Enforcing Them, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2017, 11:25 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/lazarus/la-fi-lazarus-cfpb-mulvaney-changes-20171222-story.html
(reporting that Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Acting Director Mick Mulvaney once referred
to his agency as a “sick, sad joke”).
131. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 66, at 586 (noting that “the bureaucracy constitutes an independent
force . . . and its cooperation must be won to achieve any desired outcome”); see also Jennifer Nou,
Bureaucratic Resistance from Below, YALE J. ON REG. NOTICE & COMMENT (Nov. 16, 2016), http://
yalejreg.com/nc/bureaucratic-resistance-from-below-by-jennifer-nou [https://perma.cc/K5GK-MKZA]
(presenting typology of bureaucratic resistance mechanisms).
132. See Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal–Agent Theories: Law and the Judicial Hierarchy, 105
NW. U. L. REV. 535, 546 (2011) (defining shirking). Some authors distinguish between two forms of
shirking: agents that pursue their own policy goals instead of their principal’s objectives (“zealots”) and
agents that engage in effort levels that maximize their own welfare rather than their principal’s
(“slackers”). See generally Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy
Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 873 (2007) (discussing “zealots” and
“slackers” at length). Although most of this Article addresses how principals use advisory committees to
mitigate against what Gailmard and Patty term “zealots,” we note that these committees also may
temper civil servants’ slacking, by, in a sense, providing a quality-assurance team to double-check the
civil servants’ work and perhaps ferret out slacking-induced errors.
133. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(8)(A) (2012) (“Employees should be protected against arbitrary
action, personal favoritism, or coercion for partisan political purposes . . . .”). Complicating matters, an
outgoing presidential administration may exploit these civil service personnel protections by
“burrowing” political appointees into the civil service, thereby entrenching their ideological allies in the
administrative state and increasing the ideological gap between the incoming administration and the
federal workforce. See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel
Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 606–16 (2003).
134. See, e.g., Ralph R. Smith, Which Party Receives the Most in Political Contributions from
Federal Employees?, FEDSMITH.COM (May 19, 2016), https://www.fedsmith.com/2016/05/19/whichparty-receives-the-most-in-political-contributions-from-federal-employees [https://perma.cc/SN94-JWW5]
(“The general view of government employees is that they prefer Democrats over Republicans as they
benefit economically by having more money allocated for government spending.”); Hans A. von
Spakovsky, Liberal Civil Servants Treat Political Opponents as Enemies, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 7,
2011), https://www.heritage.org/commentary/liberal-civil-servants-treat-political-opponents-enemies
[https://perma.cc/5WP6-AQ8K] (stating that the “civil service is dominated by liberals and radicals”).
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it is certainly not true in every case. Based on a survey of individuals in senior positions across the Executive Branch, Joshua Clinton and several colleagues estimated
ideological ideal points for high-ranking career civil servants across fifteen major
Cabinet departments.135 Although their study is based on a survey conducted in
2007 and 2008, their estimates are likely to be stable over time, because turnover in
the career civil service is low.136 (Indeed, a follow-on study in 2014 yields closely
matching results.137)
Figure 1 reports the findings of Clinton and his collaborators. Positive values
signify a more conservative orientation for the mean civil servant respondent in
each department, whereas negative values connote a more liberal orientation.
Figure 1: Civil Servants’ Political Preferences

135. See generally Clinton et al., supra note 129; see also Joshua D. Clinton et al., Replication Data
for “2012 ‘Separated Powers,’” https://my.vanderbilt.edu/joshclinton/data (last visited July 29, 2019)
(data on file with the authors). Clinton and colleagues administered surveys to both political appointees
and civil servants, and they report the results separately for each of these two categories of respondent.
We adopt their civil servant-only estimates here.
136. See David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law, 85 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 44 (2018) (noting “exceedingly low rate of exit” for federal employees).
137. See Mark D. Richardson, Joshua D. Clinton & David E. Lewis, Elite Perceptions of Agency
Ideology and Workforce Skill, 89 J. POL. 303, 306 (2018) (noting correlation of 0.80). The 2014 survey
asked senior federal officials to say whether specific agencies slant liberal, conservative, or neither. Id. at
304. It did not—surprisingly—ask respondents to distinguish between political appointees and careerists
at agencies. We say this is surprising because one of the key findings of the 2008 survey by Clinton,
Bertelli, Grose, Lewis, and Nixon was that the preferences of political appointees and careerists are not
always aligned. See Clinton et al., supra note 129, at 345 fig.1.
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Figure 1 shows significant variation in the ideological preferences of civil
servants across agencies. The Department of Defense is the agency with the
most conservative careerists, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
is the agency with the most liberal civil servants. This suggests that a liberal
Defense Secretary in a Democratic administration is likely to face resistance
from agency staff, as is a conservative EPA Administrator in a Republican
administration. Indeed, accounts of the Defense Department under Democratic
Presidents and the EPA under Republican administrations anecdotally confirm
this expectation.138
Preference divergence between career civil servants and the presidential
administration presents a dilemma for agency heads. Given the scope and complexity of many regulatory areas and the relatively small cadre of mostly shortterm political appointees,139 an agency head is faced with what initially seems
like a stark choice: rely on civil servants who are subject-matter experts but do
not share the agency head’s worldview, or seek out likeminded but potentially
less-informed individuals for guidance.
Advisory committees provide an escape hatch. By forming new advisory committees stacked with ideological allies or by reshaping the composition of advisory committees that already exist, agency heads can advance their own agendas
notwithstanding the divergent preferences of career staff. Sympathetic advisory
committees can provide an agency head with information unfiltered through civil
servants, or, in some cases, even supply a ready-made policy that the agency head
can then adopt.140 Even when an agency head already knows what policy she
wishes to adopt, an advisory committee can help the agency head justify the
policy—potentially increasing the likelihood that the policy will pass judicial
muster.141 And still in other cases, an advisory committee will serve an important
function simply by verifying that the agency’s civil servants—notwithstanding
their divergent preferences—have provided sound advice.142
138. Compare Rebecca Ingber, supra note 20, at 214 (noting that “bureaucratic resistance”
contributed to President Obama’s failure to close Guantanamo), with B. Dan Wood, Principals,
Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 213, 228 (1988)
(observing that career civil servants at EPA thwarted Reagan administration’s deregulatory agenda).
139. See O’Connell, supra note 126, at 935 (“[I]n sheer numbers, the layer of political personnel in
the federal workforce is thin.”); id. at 919 n.23 (reporting median appointee tenure of approximately two
to three years).
140. See, e.g., Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin., TSA Update on ASAC Recommendations (July
14, 2015), https://www.tsa.gov/news/releases/2015/07/14/tsa-update-asac-recommendations [https://
perma.cc/DC49-QJJA] (adopting twenty-six of twenty-eight recommendations from the Department of
Homeland Security’s Aviation Security Advisory Committee).
141. Cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(stating that an agency—to survive judicial review—must “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
action”).
142. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, E.P.A to Adopt Clinton Arsenic Standard, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1,
2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/01/us/epa-to-adopt-clinton-arsenic-standard.html (noting
decision by President George W. Bush’s first EPA Administrator, Christine Todd Whitman, to adopt a
more stringent standard for arsenic in drinking water after an advisory committee tasked by Whitman
affirmed the findings of EPA career staff).
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The advisory committee structure supports agency heads who seek outside
advice in several ways. For one, government employees organize meetings, procure needed information, and otherwise facilitate advisory committees’ operations. In fiscal year 2017, for instance, the equivalent of over 1,500 full-time
government employees provided these support services.143 Agencies fund members’ travel for committee meetings, pay fees to outside consultants to assist committees, and—for a subset of committees—pay honoraria.144 Further, the prestige
that comes with selection to a federal panel may encourage members to devote
their energies to their committees’ subject matter.
Certainly, advisory committees are not the only escape route for agency heads
seeking to loosen the cognitive grip of career staff. They also can solicit outside
opinions through procedures such as notice-and-comment rulemaking, though
this procedure involves substantial resource costs.145 They can seek input from
White House bodies such as the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) or the
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), though the two dozen or so
CEA employees and even fewer OSTP employees are no substitute for more than
75,000 advisory committee members.146 And they can consult with lobbyists,
though the number of active registered federal lobbyists (11,650 in 2018147) is
still only a fraction of the number of advisory committee members, and these lobbyists often lack the subject-matter expertise that many advisory committee
members possess.
Advisory committees, importantly, are not a costless solution for agency heads
facing resistance from career bureaucrats. Identifying nominees, complying with
FACA, funding committee activities, and assigning staff to assist committees all
involve resource costs. Naturally, resources expended on advisory committees
cannot be used productively elsewhere. Similarly, involving another entity in policymaking could stretch out the policymaking process, creating red tape and contributing to regulatory ossification. And the use of advisory committees carries
potential risks as well as potential rewards: members may, for example, ally with
civil servants instead of the agency heads.148 Thus, although there are strong theoretical reasons to expect that agency heads will use advisory committees as counterweights to career civil servants with differing preferences, the proof lies in the
(quantitative and qualitative) pudding. The next Part assesses our shallow state
143. FACA DATABASE, supra note 1.
144. See id.
145. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the
Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 896 (2008).
146. For statistics on CEA and OSTP staff sizes, see Council of Economic Advisers Salaries of 2017,
FEDERALPAY.ORG, https://www.federalpay.org/employees/council-of-economic-advisers/2017 [https://
perma.cc/2CP4-W3PL] (last visited July 24, 2019); Office of Science and Technology Policy Salaries of
2017, FEDERALPAY.ORG, https://www.federalpay.org/employees/office-of-science-and-technology-policy
[https://perma.cc/P3MB-5Y25] (last visited July 24, 2019).
147. See Lobbying Database, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby [https://perma.
cc/2SDN-62FM] (last updated June 17, 2019) (noting 11,654 active registered federal lobbyists for
2018).
148. See infra Section IV.E.
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model and alternative models of advisory committee interactions using quantitative methods. Part IV presents four focused case studies and evaluates the extent
to which those committees’ activities conform to our model’s predictions.
III. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
This Part applies quantitative analysis to evaluate various theoretical accounts
of advisory committees. We first examine the political composition of a randomly
selected sample of 2,500 advisory committee members who served at some point
from fiscal years 1997 through 2017.149 Then, we probe the circumstances under
which agencies decide to engage advisory committees, and we consider the
effects of advisory committee engagement on agency reputation and resources.
A. COMMITTEE COMPOSITION

We begin by assessing whether the ideological composition of advisory committees reflects the preferences of the President, the current Congress, or (for
committees established by statute) the Congress that created the committee. We
combine several sources of information to conduct this assessment. To identify
advisory committee members, we rely on datasets maintained by the General
Services Administration, which include the names, occupations, and committee
assignments of all advisory committee members serving at any point from fiscal
year 1997 through fiscal year 2017.150 (That date range reflects the full coverage
of the General Service Administration’s FACA Database as of this writing.) We
select a random sample of 2,500 of the 334,248 unique individuals who served on
one of the 2,536 committees in existence during this period.151
To estimate each committee member’s ideological preferences, we utilize
Adam Bonica’s Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections
(DIME).152 DIME leverages over 16.4 million political contributions from individuals and organizations to candidates and political action committees between
1979 and 2014 to assign an ideological score, known as a Campaign Finance
Score (CF Score), to both donors and recipients.153 To generate preference
149. Grant review panels and National Institutes of Health “special emphasis panels,” which are ad
hoc groups on which members serve for only one meeting, are excluded from the sample. See, e.g.,
Special Emphasis Panels, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH,
https://www.niaaa.nih.gov/grant-funding/application-process/special-emphasis-panels [https://perma.
cc/C5JB-BCA4] (last visited July 27, 2019).
150. See FACA DATABASE, supra note 65.
151. This sample—2,500 individuals out of 334,248—is constrained by the labor-intensive nature of
matching individuals in the FACA and DIME databases. Even uncommon names typically appear
multiple times in DIME, which impedes fuzzy matching and necessitates time-consuming hand-coding
to identify the correct individuals based on other indicia, for example, location, occupation, and
employer. A team of six research assistants logged several hundred hours of work as part of this process.
152. Adam Bonica, Codebook for the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections
(DIME) (Version 2.0) (Aug. 16, 2016), https://dataverse.harvard.edu/api/access/datafile/2865308
[https://perma.cc/FY4K-J7BU].
153. Id. at 3–5. DIME obtains these data from the Federal Election Commission, various state
agencies, the Center for Responsive Politics, and the Sunlight Foundation. See Adam Bonica, Mapping
the Ideological Marketplace, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 367, 370 (2014). To be assigned a CF Score, a donor
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estimates, DIME employs an algorithm to place donors along a left–right scale
such that the distance between donors with similar patterns of political donations
is minimized.154 The method assumes, essentially, that these donations constitute
a form of revealed preferences.155 CF scores range from 2 for the most liberal
donors and recipients, to 2 for the most conservative.156 The population of donors
included in DIME is normally distributed, with a mean CF score for donors of
zero and a standard deviation of one.157
The use of CF scores as a measure of political preferences is now widely
accepted in both law and political science.158 Aside from the measure’s widespread acceptance, there are a number of reasons to believe that it is a valid estimate of individual ideology. First, CF scores closely correlate with measures of
ideology based on lawmakers’ voting behavior.159 Second, and consistent with
the view that individual ideology is a mostly unchanging characteristic, CF scores
remain quite stable for individuals across time.160 Third, CF scores are strong predictors of individual-level survey responses to questions regarding ideologically
salient issues such as abortion, affirmative action, the environment, fiscal policy,
immigration, and same-sex marriage.161 All these considerations give us confidence that CF scores are reasonable proxies for the ideological preferences of advisory committee appointees.
Of the 2,500 appointees in our random sample, 1,081 had corresponding CF
scores,162 meaning that 43.2% of the committee members in our sample made at
least two recorded campaign contributions.163 This donation rate is significantly
must give to at least two recipients in DIME, and a recipient must receive funds from at least two donors
in DIME. Id.
154. Id. at 369–70.
155. See id. at 373 (contending that CF Scores tend to reflect donors’ sincere views, rather than their
strategic behavior).
156. See id. at 371.
157. Id. at 369.
158. See, e.g., Gregory J. Martin & Zachary Peskowitz, Agency Problems in Political Campaigns:
Media Buying and Consulting, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 231, 235 (2018) (using CF scores to estimate the
ideological preferences of political consultants); see also Jamie L. Carson & Ryan D. Williamson,
Candidate Ideology and Electoral Success in Congressional Elections, 176 PUB. CHOICE 175, 183
(2018) (congressional candidates); Adam S. Chilton & Eric A. Posner, An Empirical Study of Political
Bias in Legal Scholarship, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 282 (2015) (law professors); Brian D. Feinstein &
Daniel J. Hemel, Partisan Balance with Bite, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 19 (2018) (independent
commissioners).
159. Bonica, supra note 152, at 5–6.
160. See Bonica, supra note 153, at 373.
161. See Adam Bonica, Are Donation-Based Measures of Ideology Valid Predictors of IndividualLevel Policy Preferences?, 81 J. POL. 327, 329–31 (2019).
162. A team of five undergraduate and law student research assistants helped us match appointees to
CF scores. The matching process involves collection of biographical information from publicly
available sources to confirm, for example, that the “Howard Berman” appointed to the ICE Advisory
Committee on Family Residential Centers is the same “Howard Berman” who appears in DIME as a
senior advisor to Covington & Burling (and not, for example, the “Howard Berman” who is a rabbi in
Boston).
163. These 2,500 randomly selected committee members served on committees in 43 different
executive departments and independent agencies. Donation rates differ by agency. Among the agencies
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higher than the portion of the general population that appears in DIME (five percent),164 though the high rate is unsurprising for a group that is actively involved
in advising the federal government.165 Notably, advisory committee member donation rates by agency are unconnected to the partisan leanings of that agency’s
leadership or civil servants.166
What should one make of the 56.8% of committee members that do not
appear in DIME (and thus are excluded from the analysis in this section)? One
possibility is that their lack of big-dollar donations indicates that they are less
ideologically motivated, and thus more likely to serve on advisory committees
as politically neutral technocrats. (To be included in DIME, one has to make
multiple donations of at least $200 each.) We suspect, however, that the universe of politically motivated individuals is larger than the set of donors.167
Regardless, we emphasize that the conclusions we derive from quantitative
analysis are constrained by the availability of data. (This is one more reason to
supplement our quantitative analysis with qualitative case studies, as we do in
Part IV.)
After matching advisory committee members to CF scores, we examine how
the ideological composition of committees has changed over a twenty-one-year
span. Figure 2 displays the results of this analysis. For each fiscal year during the
study period, the figure includes a density plot of the CF scores for the randomly
selected individuals who served in that twelve-month time frame. For fiscal years
that fell mostly or entirely during Republican administrations, the corresponding
plot is demarked with a solid line, and with a dashed line for Democratic

from which five or more advisory committee members were randomly chosen, donation rates ranged
from 22.1% for the Department of Transportation to 71.4% for the Securities and Exchange
Commission, with a mean of 40.1% and a standard deviation of 11.1%.
164. See Adam Bonica, Adam S. Chilton & Maya Sen, The Political Ideologies of American
Lawyers, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 277, 286 (2016).
165. This rate of appearance in DIME is not as high, however, as the rates for members of elite
groups like corporate CEOs and board members, members of federal commissions like the SEC, and
former Supreme Court law clerks. See Adam Bonica, Avenues of Influence: On the Political
Expenditures of Corporations and their Directors and Executives, 18 BUS. POL. 367, 375 (2016) (83%
for CEOs and corporate board members); Adam Bonica et al., The Political Ideologies of Law Clerks, 19
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 96, 105 (2016) (66% for former Supreme Court clerks); Feinstein & Hemel, supra
note 158, at 38 (reporting that 80% of members of multi-member agencies are included in DIME).
166. This finding was obtained by running a variation on the regression models in Table 3, infra, with
agencies’ donation rates as the dependent variable.
There is, however, suggestive evidence that agencies that regulate or interact with more lucrative
professions have higher donation rates for their advisers, as the SEC and CFTC enjoy, respectively, the
highest and third-highest rates. On other end, advisers to the National Endowment for the Arts have the
second-lowest rate. NEA advisers may not be starving artists, but neither do they spend like securities
industry professionals.
167. Cf. Michael J. Barber, Brandice Canes-Wrone & Sharece Thrower, Ideologically Sophisticated
Donors: Which Candidates Do Individual Contributors Finance?, 61 AM. J. POL. SCI. 271, 274 n.7
(2017) (finding no material difference in motivations for donors who give $200 versus those who give
substantially more).
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administrations.168 Because the federal government’s fiscal year runs from
October 1 to September 30169 and new Presidents are inaugurated on January
20,170 the correspondence between fiscal years and presidential administrations is
imprecise in the year of a presidential transition (fiscal years 2001, 2009, and
2017).
Figure 2: Ideological Position of Randomly Selected Sample of Advisory
Committee Members, FY 1997–2017

Figure 2 shows that the ideological posture of advisory committee members
tends to move in the direction of the President. The distributions skew left during
Democratic administrations and shift to the right during most periods of

168. For readers following along on a black-and-white printout, years under a Democratic
administration will appear light gray, and years under a Republican administration will appear in dark
gray.
169. See Glossary Term: Fiscal Year, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_
term/fiscal_year.htm [https://perma.cc/U34R-CJ7G] (last visited July 30, 2019).
170. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
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Republican control.171 (The lingering left-of-center skew in fiscal year 2017—the
first partial fiscal year of the Trump Administration—may be attributable to the
fact that Barack Obama remained President for the first sixteen weeks of fiscal
year 2017.)
Already, these initial results shed some light on several of the positive and
normative claims that we canvass in Part II. Despite Professor Bybee’s concern that FACA’s “fairly balanced” requirement would prevent the President
and his administration from staffing advisory committees with individuals of
their choosing,172 we find that committee composition is highly responsive
to the President’s preferences. Even though political movement among the
general public is glacially slow,173 the ideology of the modal advisory committee member quickly flips from liberal to conservative with the Clintonto-Bush transition and back from conservative to liberal with the Bush-toObama transition. Although this responsiveness will be viewed as desirable
by those who envision advisory committees as instruments of presidential
administration, it may be more concerning to those who see advisory committees as guides for judicial review. The shift in composition from administration to administration may suggest that advisory committees are not
neutral arbiters, but instead are very much part of the President’s political
coalition.
Diving deeper, we use regression analysis to examine the relationship between
the ideological preferences of advisory committee members and those of the
President and Congress. To do so, we make use of DW-NOMINATE scores,
another commonly used estimate of ideology.174 Applying a similar algorithm as
DIME, DW-NOMINATE arranges legislators on a liberal-to-conservative scale,

171. As a robustness check to ensure that our randomly selected sample accurately reflected overall
advisory committee composition, we conducted a parallel analysis of the members of nine specific
committees that address environmental policy, financial regulation, and tax policy. Within these policy
areas, we selected committees with a diverse set of characteristics, namely: (i) location in an executive
department or independent agency; (ii) establishment via statute or agency initiative; and (iii) functional
classification in the GSA FACA Database. The results of this alternative analysis are consistent with the
random sample.
The nine committees used in this alternative analysis are: the Bureau of Land Management Alaska
Resource Advisory Council, the CFTC Global Markets Advisory Committee, the EPA Clean Air Act
Advisory Committee, the EPA National Drinking Water Advisory Council, the FDIC Advisory
Committee on Community Banking, the IRS Advisory Committee on Tax Exempt and Government
Entities, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Reactor Safeguards Advisory Committee, and Office of
Financial Research (Treasury) Financial Research Advisory Committee.
172. See Bybee, supra note 14, at 125.
173. See ROBERT S. ERIKSON, MICHAEL B. MACKUEN & JAMES A. STIMSON, THE MACRO POLITY
119 (2002).
174. See, e.g., Cynthia Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional Dysfunction?,
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1693 (2015); Nolan McCarty, Pivotal Politics, Partisan Polarization, and
Policy Predictability, 80 J. POL. 1076, 1077 (2018); Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1903, 1944 (2012).
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going from 1 to þ1, based on their roll call voting patterns.175 DWNOMINATE also places Presidents on the same scale based on the subset of roll
call votes for which the President offers a position.176
Table 1 presents these results. In Column 1, we regress each committee member’s CF score on the DW-NOMINATE score for the President in the year of the
member’s appointment. In Column 2, we regress each committee member’s CF
score on the DW-NOMINATE score for the median representative in the House
in the year of the member’s appointment. (The results are substantively similar
when we use the DW-NOMINATE score of the median senator instead.) In
Column 3, we limit our sample to advisory committee members who served on
the subset of panels established by statute, and we regress each committee member’s CF score on the DW-NOMINATE score for the median House member in
the Congress that established the committee. In Column 4, we include all three
explanatory variables—the President’s preferences, the current Congress’s preferences, and the enacting Congress’s preferences—in the regression analysis.
TABLE 1: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PREFERENCES OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND
PREFERENCES OF PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS

Table 1 shows that Republican presidential administrations are associated with
more conservative appointees to advisory committees, and Democratic administrations are associated with more liberal appointees, confirming through
175. See KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
ROLL CALL VOTING 23–24 (2000).
176. Id. at 23. Because DW-NOMINATE only calculates presidential ideal point estimates through
President Obama, our analyses using this measure end in 2016. Although DW-NOMINATE does not
include ideal point estimates for agency heads that have not served in Congress, we expect that their
preferences would roughly track the President’s because appointees are selected based largely on their
loyalty to the President’s program. See Michael A. Livermore, Political Parties and Presidential
Oversight, 67 ALA. L. REV. 45, 52 (2015); Donald Moynihan & Alasdair S. Roberts, The Triumph of
Loyalty Over Competence: The Bush Administration and the Exhaustion of the Politicized Presidency,
70 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 572, 573 (2010).
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regression analysis what Figure 2 displays visually. Specifically, a one-point
increase in the President’s DW-NOMINATE score—essentially, moving from
President Obama to President George W. Bush—is associated with a 0.611-point
expected increase in the CF Score of a new appointee to an advisory committee.
(Recall that DW-NOMINATE uses a 1 to þ1 scale; most CF scores range from
2 to þ2; and both scales are liberal-to-conservative.) To put this 0.611-point
difference in perspective, consider that 0.626 points separate Senator Susan
Collins, a moderate Maine Republican, from Representative Debbie Wasserman
Schultz of Florida, the former chair of the Democratic National Committee.177
By contrast, the preferences of new advisory committee members do not appear
to reflect the preferences of the current Congress or the Congress that created the
committee. Indeed, the association between the current Congress’s preferences
and those of new advisory committee members is negative, though the estimate is
imprecise, and based on Column 4 we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
effect is zero. These findings cast doubt on the notion that advisory committees act
as fire-alarm monitors for the current Congress.178 It would be surprising if
Congress relied on individuals who do not share its ideological preferences to
serve a fire-alarm function. The findings also cast doubt on the deck-stacking
theory of advisory committees.179 If Congress designs advisory committees to
reflect the preferences of the coalition that created the committee, then these panels do not appear to be doing the job that Congress had in mind for them. 180
B. COMMITTEE ENGAGEMENT

Our finding that advisory committee composition reflects the ideological preferences of the sitting President provides a first piece of evidence in favor of the shallow state account. The fact that presidential administrations populate advisory
committees with ideologically sympathetic individuals does not prove, though,
that administrations use advisory committees as counterweights to career staff.
In this section, we consider whether preference divergence between presidential
administrations and civil servants is associated with the creation, funding, and convening of committees. This section focuses specifically on advisory committees
with a policy function—what the General Services Administration classifies as a
177. See Adam Bonica, DIME Scores for Congressional Candidates for 1980–2018 Elections
Cycles, STAN. UNIV., https://www.dropbox.com/s/zg3x8ugbjcv4jb0/dime_cong_elections_current.csv?
dl=1 [https://perma.cc/UBW4-B9CU] (last updated Oct. 31, 2018).
178. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
180. The fact that the GSA reports data on committee rosters by fiscal year—and some fiscal years
span multiple Congresses and presidential administrations—potentially biases these estimates.
Accordingly, as a robustness check, we re-ran all models, first, excluding the fiscal year that includes the
start of each new presidential administration (for example, fiscal year 2017 for the Trump
Administration) and, second, excluding all fiscal years in which a new Congress is seated (that is, oddnumbered fiscal years). The coefficient estimates maintained the same sign, approximate size, and
significance (or lack thereof) at least at the p < 0.10 level.
We performed the same exclusions in every subsequent analysis reported in this Article. The results
for all models were substantially similar.
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“National Policy Issue Advisory Board.”181 To preview our results, we find correlations between White House-civil servant preference divergence and advisory committee activity. We then develop and test hypotheses to evaluate the four extant
theories regarding committee engagement. These tests yield mostly null results.
1. President–Civil Servant Preference Divergence and Committee Engagement
If, as our shallow state account claims, political appointees use advisory committees as counterweights to civil servants with differing positions, then one
should expect greater engagement as preference divergence between appointees
and civil servants increases. To measure the preferences of civil servants in each
department, we return to the survey-based ideal point estimates generated by
Joshua Clinton and colleagues.182 The advantage of this measure is that—unlike
other measures of federal employees’ ideologies—it distinguishes between the
preferences of political appointees and civil servants, thus allowing us to use only
ideal points for the latter group.183 The drawback of this measure is that it is not
dynamic. Clinton and colleagues administered their survey in 2007 and 2008, but
we adopt their estimate for civil servants over fiscal years 1997–2017. Although
more regularly updated estimates would be preferable, we take comfort in the
fact that Clinton et al.’s estimates come from the middle of our study period, the
turnover rate among federal employees is low,184 and point-in-time estimates of
agency ideology from different periods are strongly correlated (for example, the
Defense Department remains conservative and the EPA remains liberal).185
We first employ as our dependent variable the number of new policy boards
created in each of sixteen cabinet departments during fiscal years 1997 through
2017.186 We then estimate the following Poisson regression model:187
181. The General Services Administration’s FACA Database applies the “national policy issue advisory
board” label to “committees devoted to advising agencies on the implementation of National Policy Issues.”
Common Questions About Federal Advisory Committees, GEN. SERV. ADMIN., https://d2d.gsa.gov/report/ogpfederal-advisory-committee-act-faca-data [https://perma.cc/GA2C-DX4E] (last visited Aug. 4, 2019); accord
WENDY GINSBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44232, CREATING A FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE IN THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH 5 n.28 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44232.pdf (“Committees in this category
advise agencies on a specific policy issue.”). Political scientist Kathleen Doherty offers a less tautological
definition: these boards “propose policy solutions to an issue,” in contrast to non-scientific and “scientific
technical” program advisory boards, which provide advice regarding the implementation of an existing
program. Kathleen M. Doherty, Seeking Experts or Agents of Control: The Use of Advisory Committees in
Bureaucratic Policymaking 45–46 (Sept. 3, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/
KMD-AdComs_V.pdf [https://perma.cc/3759-7VSZ].
182. Clinton et al., supra note 135.
183. This is in contrast to other estimates that aggregate political appointees and civil servants. See,
e.g., Jowei Chen & Tim Johnson, Federal Employee Unionization and Presidential Control of the
Bureaucracy: Estimating and Explaining Ideological Change in Executive Agencies, 27 J. THEORETICAL
POL. 151, 162–63 (2015); Joshua D. Clinton & David E. Lewis, Expert Opinion, Agency
Characteristics, and Agency Preferences, 16 POL. ANALYSIS 3, 6 fig.1 (2008); Richardson et al., supra
note 137, at 304.
184. See Fontana & Huq, supra note 136, at 44.
185. See Richardson et al., supra note 137, at 307 (noting “much agreement on the relative ideology
of many agencies”).
186. We collect these data from information available on the General Service Administration’s
FACA Database. See FACA DATABASE, supra note 65.
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ln (NewCommitteesit) = a þ b 1*CareeristPreferencesi
þ b 2* DemPresidentt
þ b 3* CareeristPreferencesi*DemPresidentt þ « it

where:
� NewCommitteesit is the number of new national policy boards created in
department i in year t;
� CareeristPreferencesi is an estimate of the ideological preferences of department i;
� DemPresidentt is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the President in year
t is a Democrat;
� CareeristPreferencesi*DemPresidentt is an interaction term; and
� « it is an error term for it, clustered at the department level.

We then repeat this analysis for two more measures of committee engagement:
the inflation-adjusted amount that each cabinet department spent on advisory
committees annually and the number of meetings convened by committees at
each department.188 Because agency heads mostly have discretion to shift funds
between advisory committees and other uses, committee funding levels serve as
an effective proxy for the extent to which agency heads empower committees.189
Table 2 reports the results.190 Our use of the interaction term DemPresidentt
means that the estimate on CareeristPreferencesi reflects the relationship
between careerist preferences and the dependent variable when DemPresidentt =
0 (that is, when the President is a Republican).191 The interaction term
187. Poisson regression is appropriate where, as here, the dependent variable is an event count
without an upper limit and overdispersion is not present. See ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA
ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS 112 (2007). As a robustness
check, we repeat all analyses using ordinary least squares regression, and the signs and significance
levels of our estimates remain the same.
188. All three measures were calculated from the yearly FACA Data files available at FACA
DATABASE, supra note 65. The number of new committees is derived from the New Committee This FY
column; expenditures is derived from Total Actual Committee Cost; and the number of meetings is
derived from Committee Meeting Total. Expenditures are converted to millions of 2016 dollars using the
Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Inflation Calculator. See Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject: CPI
Inflation Calculator, DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm [https://perma.
cc/XA4P-7D4S] (last visited Dec. 19, 2019).
Because the distribution of advisory committee meetings by department is overdispersed, we estimate
a negative binomial model for all models with this dependent variable. See GELMAN & HILL, supra note
187, at 115. Again, we repeat all analyses using an ordinary least squares regression model and find no
change to signs or significance levels.
189. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, 131 Stat. 135 (2017)
(including specific line items for only three advisory committees across the entire federal government).
190. Based on the possibility that agency budgeting may exhibit a status-quo bias, we also estimated an
alternative version of Model 2 with a time-series cross-sectional model. The results were substantially
similar. Cf. Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax
Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 506–07 (1998) (status-quo bias in federal budgeting).
191. See Bear F. Braumoeller, Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms, 58 INT’L
ORG. 807, 809 (2004).
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CareeristPreferencesi*DemPresidentt reflects the relationship between careerist
preferences and the dependent variable when DemPresidentt = 1. The estimate on
DemPresidentt, though included for completeness, is not meaningful for our purposes.192 Our discussion focuses on the estimates that appear in bold.
TABLE 2: PRESIDENT–CIVIL SERVANT PREFERENCE DIVERGENCE AND COMMITTEE
ENGAGEMENT

The basic conclusions from Table 2 are as follows.
� The negatively signed, statistically significant coefficient estimates for
Careerist Preferences indicate that, during Republican administrations, more
conservative civil servants in a given department are associated with the creation of fewer policy-related committees in that department, less funding allocated to policy-related advisory committees at the department, and fewer
meetings of policy-related advisory committees at the department.
� The positively signed, statistically significant coefficient estimates for the
interaction term in Column 1 (new committees) and Column 3 (meetings)
indicate that, during Democratic administrations, more conservative civil
servants in a given department are associated with more policy-related advisory committees being created and more meetings of those committees.
� The positively signed coefficient estimate for the interaction term in Column 2
(funding) is suggestive of higher funding levels under Democratic administrations
for advisory committees at departments with more conservative careerists, but the
estimate falls below conventional thresholds for statistical significance.

Because the substantive interpretation of coefficients in models with logarithmically transformed dependent variables is not intuitive, we generate simulated
first differences, or differences in the expected number of new committees at set
levels of each independent variable.193
192. To be precise, the estimate on DemPresidentt is the effect of a Democratic President on
committee engagement when CareeristPreferencesi = 0.
193. We estimate quantities of interest by running one thousand simulations in Zelig using a Poisson
regression model. For more information about the Zelig software, see generally Christine Choirat et al.,
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We find that agencies with liberal workforces—defined in these simulations as
agencies at the twenty-fifth percentile for Careerist Preferences—create 0.33
more policy-related advisory committees per year under a Republican President
than under a Democratic President.194 Given that a mean of 1.4 new policy-related
committees are created per agency each year, these first differences are substantial.
Consistent with the shallow state model, we also observe that agencies with conservative workforces form policy-related committees at a lower rate when a
Republican occupies the White House. However, in this case the simulated firstdifferences estimate falls short of conventional levels of statistical significance.195
Simulated first differences for Column 2 tell a similar story. Our estimates indicate that conservative agencies spend $590,002 more on policy-related advisory
committees per year in expectation when a Democrat is President than when a
Republican occupies the Oval Office.196 Again, the difference between Democratic
and Republican administrations is substantial—approximately one-third of annualmean spending per agency on national policy issue advisory boards.197 We cannot,
however, reject the null hypothesis that spending levels do not differ for liberal
agencies across Democratic and Republican administrations.198
The results in Column 3 provide the clearest illustration of the shallow state
account in action. Simulated first differences reveal that, with a Republican
President, agencies with a liberal workforce hold 14.4 more meetings, and those
with a conservative workforce hold 6.8 fewer meetings, in expectation.199 Note
that the mean agency convenes 24.1 meetings of policy-related advisory committees per year. These estimates indicate a sharp uptick in advisory committee activity when agency careerists and the White House are ideologically at odds.
All in all, the results in Table 2 provide robust support for the claim that wider
preference divergence between the President and civil servants at a given agency
is associated with greater engagement of advisory committees at that agency.
These results are consistent with the shallow state account, which posits that
Presidents and political appointees use advisory committees as an alternative
source of expertise—bypassing career civil servants—when the President’s preferences and those of civil servants are misaligned.
We next consider whether the four existing accounts of advisory committees
can also help to explain committee engagement across agencies. The analyses to
follow yield mostly null results, suggesting that these accounts may have limited
explanatory power.
Zelig: Everyone’s Statistical Software, ZELIG PROJECT (2017 ed., version 5.0-15), http://www.
zeligproject.org [https://perma.cc/Z422-4JFF].
194. 95% confidence interval: 0.01, 0.68.
195. For agencies at the seventy-fifth percentile for Careerist Preferences, we estimate 0.09 fewer
committees per year under Republican Presidents versus Democratic Presidents, but we note that the
95% confidence interval spans zero ( 0.38, 0.22).
196. 95% confidence interval: $589,677, $590,332. Figures are expressed in 2016 dollars.
197. Annual mean spending per agency is $1,782,218. Note that this figure includes only spending on
national policy issue advisory boards, not expenditures on other types of advisory committees. See supra note 65.
198. 95% confidence interval: $828,356, $874,454.
199. 95% confidence interval for liberal agencies: 2.8, 27.5; for conservative agencies: 13.0, 1.1.
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2. President–Congress Preference Divergence and Committee Engagement
In Table 3, we examine whether committee engagement is associated with
preference divergence between the presidential administration and Congress.
When that divergence is wide, we might expect agencies to be more likely to
stray from legislators’ preferences, and we might expect lawmakers to be more
watchful of administration activities. If advisory committees serve as fire-alarm
monitors for Congress, we might therefore expect their activities to be intensified
when the President and Congress are at odds. We measure divergence two ways:
whether the White House and at least one chamber of Congress are controlled by
different parties and the difference in DW-NOMINATE ideal points between the
President and the median House member. (A third specification, not included in
the table, measures divergence as the difference in ideal points between the
President and the median senator. This model also yields null findings.)
TABLE 3: PRESIDENT–CONGRESS PREFERENCE DIVERGENCE AND COMMITTEE
ENGAGEMENT

Again, we find little support for the claim that advisory committees act as firealarm monitors for Congress. Coefficient estimates are inconsistently signed and
all fall well below conventional thresholds for statistical significance. This finding may be unsurprising in light of our results in Table 1, which cast doubt on the
reliability of advisory committee members as faithful congressional agents.
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3. Agency Reputation and Committee Engagement
We next consider the claim that agencies use advisory committees for reputational purposes. In Table 4, we examine whether agencies that are publicly
criticized by a respected entity in one year tend to engage more with advisory
committees in the next year. If agencies create, fund, and convene advisory committees in order to boost their reputations, we might expect them to do so more after suffering a reputational hit. To operationalize public criticism, we draw on a
dataset of agency critiques by agencies inspectors general, the Government
Accountability Office, or the New York Times or Wall Street Journal editorial
pages.200 This dataset includes 14,431 unique subjects—termed “agency infractions”—encompassing a wide range of regulatory implementation, enforcement,
and personnel-management issues across the Executive Branch during the 1991–
2012 period.201 (We restrict our analysis to the years in which the infractions dataset and the advisory committee data overlap.)
TABLE 4: AGENCY REPUTATION AND COMMITTEE ENGAGEMENT

200. See Brian D. Feinstein, Congress in the Administrative State, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1187, 1191,
1208 (2018).
201. Id. at 1191. These infractions data include the subjects for over 90% of congressional oversight
hearings during the 1991–2012 period, which shows that the dataset captures salient issues that some
segment of the policy community deems important. See id. at 1210.
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Only one of these coefficient estimates (for the effect of previous-year infractions on new-committee formation) approaches conventional thresholds of statistical significance, and in substantive terms, the effect is miniscule.202
Table 4 suggests that agencies do not increase their engagement with advisory
committees in response to a reputational hit in the immediate past. But perhaps
they engage with advisory committees to boost their reputation in the future. We
tested this hypothesis in three ways. First, we assessed whether agencies’ greater
engagement with advisory committees is associated with fewer reported infractions
in the next year. Second, we asked whether greater engagement in one year is associated with fewer congressional oversight hearings in the next year. Third, we
examined whether committees that engage more with advisory committees receive
budget increases in the next year. These analyses, which are reported in the
Appendix, all yield null results. Engagement with advisory committees does not
appear to be connected to agencies improving their reputations in the near future.
4. Agency Resources and Committee Engagement
Finally, we consider the claim that agencies turn toward advisory committees
in response to resource constraints.203 Agencies may demand extra “informationprocessing capacity”204 either because their resources have decreased or because
their informational requirements have increased. We use the agency’s budget in
the previous year as a proxy for agency resources. (Because these models include
department fixed effects that provide a time-invariant intercept for each agency,
the agency budget covariate effectively captures relative changes in a given
agency’s budget over time.) To measure the agency’s information-processing
requirements, we look to the agency’s regulatory output: the number of regulatory restrictions on private-sector actors issued by the agency in the previous year
and the total word length of these regulations.205 As in previous analyses, committee engagement is measured by the number of new committees created, the
level of committee funding, and the number of committee meetings. Table 5
presents our results.
202. Simulated first differences using Zelig reveal that moving from an agency in which 16
infractions occurred in the previous year (that is, the 25th percentile value for this variable) to one in
which forty-five infractions occurred (that is, the 75th percentile value) is expected to be associated with
0.09 new committees created in that agency during the next year. See Choirat et al., supra note 193 (data
on file with the author).
203. See Lavertu & Weimer, supra note 15, at 231, 233.
204. See id. at 215.
205. Data on the number and length of these regulations were obtained from the Mercatus Center’s
QuantGov project. Patrick A. McLaughlin & Oliver Sherouse, RegData U.S. 3.1 Full Dataset,
QUANTGOV, MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON UNIV., https://s3.amazonaws.com/quantgov-datasets/
regdata/RegData3.1/regdata_20180226-1639.zip [https://perma.cc/QUK3-G8DB] (last visited Dec. 19,
2019).
For regulations that are coded as being issued by multiple agencies, we include only the first named
agency. Budget data is derived from Office of Management and Budget figures. See OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, HISTORICAL TABLES: TABLE 5.4 –
DISCRETIONARY BUDGET AUTHORITY BY AGENCY: 1976–2022 (2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/BUDGET-2018-TAB/xls/BUDGET-2018-TAB-6-4.xls [https://perma.cc/WGM4-VUZC].
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TABLE 5: AGENCY RESOURCES AND COMMITTEE ACTIVITY

Of the eighteen coefficient estimates in Table 5, only two achieve statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level, and those estimates—the effect of the number and length
of regulations on new committees in Column 4—are inconsistently signed. Resource
constraints arising from inputs (agency budget) or outputs (the number and length of
regulations) have no consistent association with committee engagement. These
results cast doubt on the hypothesis that agencies look to advisory committees for
extra-information-processing capacity when faced with resource constraints.
All in all, our results in Tables 3–5 offer tepid support for the notion that advisory committees serve as fire-alarm monitors for Congress, that agencies turn toward advisory committees either in response to past reputational damage or to
enhance their reputations in the future, or that they use advisory committees to
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overcome resource constraints. The only factor consistently associated with committee engagement in our analyses is preference divergence between the President
and an agency’s civil servants. The clearest conclusion to emerge from our quantitative analysis, then, is that Presidents and their administrations appear to use advisory committees as counterweights to agency careerists. In the next Part, we will
examine whether qualitative approaches bear out these quantitative findings.
IV. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
The quantitative analysis in Part III strongly supports two predictions of the
shallow-state account, that: (1) the ideological composition of advisory committees will ebb and flow with the presidential administration; and (2) the President
and his political appointees will utilize advisory committees most when the gap
between the administration’s preferences and the civil service’s preferences is
widest. Our quantitative findings cannot, however, tell us whether and why the
shallow state operates as an effective check on the deep state. The key finding in
Part III—that political appointees across multiple administrations have turned toward advisory committees when the administration’s preferences diverged from
those of agency careerists—may serve as prima facie evidence that advisory committees actually function as effective counterweights to the civil service. Why
else, after all, would political appointees go to the trouble of empaneling and convening advisory committees if these panels did not advance their purposes? Still,
a qualitative approach will assist us in uncovering the causal pathways through
which advisory committees shape policy as well as the conditions under which
the influence of advisory committees is likely to be most profound.206
We present four case studies, each involving a different agency and administration. The case studies are chosen to achieve a diversity of subjects as well as a variety of outcomes. They show how political appointees have used advisory
committees as alternative sources of information when the appointees’ preferences diverge from agency careerists. But, as the case studies also illustrate, the triumph of the shallow state is far from inevitable. Advisory committees sometimes
find their access to information curtailed or their recommendations ignored.
A. DEFENSE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN THE SERVICES

Since its establishment by Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall in 1951,
the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) has
played a sometimes peripheral and sometimes central role in shaping U.S. military policy toward gender integration.207 The committee achieved particular

206. Our approach of combining quantitative and qualitative methods follows political scientist
Sidney Tarrow’s call for “triangulation”—the application of quantitative and qualitative methods to the
same problem. As Tarrow notes, triangulation allows researchers to add nuance to quantitative results
and demonstrate the generalizability of qualitative findings. See Sidney Tarrow, Bridging the
Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Political Science, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 471, 473–74 (1995).
207. On DACOWITS’s formation and early history, see M. C. DEVILBISS, WOMEN AND MILITARY
SERVICE: A HISTORY, ANALYSIS, AND OVERVIEW OF KEY ISSUES 10 (1990). See also id. at 41 (noting
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prominence in the 1990s as the Clinton Administration faced the question of
whether to place female servicemembers in combat positions. This section examines DACOWITS’s interactions with political appointees and career officers during that episode and in the years that followed.
The controversy arose against the backdrop of a longstanding ban on women
in combat positions. Prior to 1991, a statute barred women in the Air Force,
Navy, and Marines from being assigned to aircraft engaged in combat missions,
and women in the Navy could not be assigned to duty on vessels other than hospital ships and transports.208 (Women were in practice prohibited from serving in
most other combat positions as well, but the broader ban was not codified.209) In
1991, Congress repealed the ban on women in combat aviation positions—
leaving in place the prohibition that applied to vessels210—but then-Secretary of
Defense Dick Cheney left it up to the individual services to decide whether to
deploy female aviators.211
Interest among Pentagon political appointees in gender integration increased after
President Clinton took office and named Les Aspin, a longtime Democratic congressman from Wisconsin, to be his Defense Secretary. As a member of Congress, Aspin
had been a supporter of the Equal Rights Amendment and a critic of gender-based
combat exclusions.212 At the Pentagon, he found himself at the helm of a department
where views about women in combat were mixed, with the Navy more eager to integrate women into combat roles and the Air Force and Marines more reluctant. In his
first few months on the job, Aspin delayed a Navy plan to place women in combat
aviation positions while he hammered out a service-wide policy.213
In April 1993, DACOWITS met in Washington to consider the issue.214 Air
Force Chief of Staff General Merrill McPeak told the group that he thought it was
“a mistake to open up bombers and fighters to women.”215 The committee
rejected McPeak’s position. It recommended to Aspin that he direct all branches
to open combat aviation positions to women immediately, that he approve the
Navy’s proposal to place more women on ships and patrol aircraft, and that he
support legislation to repeal the remaining statutory restriction on women serving

that DACOWITS “often has been very influential,” even though “it has little direct power to effect
change in the situation of women in the military”).
208. Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80–625, §§ 210, 212, 307(a), 62
Stat. 356, 368–369, 373; see also Jill Elaine Hasday, Fighting Women: The Military, Sex, and
Extrajudicial Constitutional Change, 93 MINN. L. REV. 96, 106 n.38 (2008).
209. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-88-222, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: MORE
MILITARY JOBS CAN BE OPENED UNDER CURRENT STATUTES 2, 8 (1998).
210. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-190,
§§ 531(a)(1), (b)(1), 105 Stat. 1290, 1365 (1991).
211. LANA OBRADOVIC, GENDER INTEGRATION IN NATO MILITARY FORCES: CROSS-NATIONAL
ANALYSIS 96 (2014).
212. See Hasday, supra note 208, at 139–40.
213. See Eric Schmitt, Women Ready to Fly for Navy, or Flee It, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1993, at A14.
214. See Melissa Healy, Aspin to Allow Women to Fly Combat Positions, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1993, at A1
(recounting meeting); Judy Pasternak, Sky’s the Limit for Squadron, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 1993, at A1 (same).
215. Schmitt, supra note 213, at A14.
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on vessels.216 Aspin adopted the substance of DACOWITS’s recommendations
days later.217
Aspin resigned as Defense Secretary in December 1993,218 but his successors
in the Clinton Administration would continue to rely on DACOWITS for counsel.
As William Perry (Defense Secretary from 1994 to 1997) told reporters,
DACOWITS served as his “eyes and ears”—traveling to bases, speaking to military personnel and their families, “and bring[ing] back that feedback to me.”219
DACOWITS would serve a similar role under Defense Secretary William Cohen,
who held the Pentagon’s top post from 1997 to 2001. When a panel led by former
Republican Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker proposed that men and women be
separated during basic training, DACOWITS produced its own report finding
“that most members of the armed services actually want more integration of the
sexes during their early months in uniform.”220 Cohen, who ultimately rejected
most of Kassebaum Baker’s proposals and maintained gender integration in basic
training, cited DACOWITS’s report when announcing his decision and added
that the advisory committee had “provided invaluable advice.”221
DACOWITS’s influence was not limited to high-profile decisions, such as
whether to allow women to serve in combat aviation roles or whether to segregate
the sexes during basic training. As retired General James Cartwright recalls,
DACOWITS “had the authority to go out and visit the commands, come up with
an independent assessment of the environment for an integrated gender force, and
anything that they said was not contributing to that environment the military had
to fix.”222 In Cartwright’s view, this “changed the incentive structure inside the
military in welcoming the gender integration activity.”223 But it also generated
criticism from conservatives who felt that the committee was pushing a “feminist
agenda”224 and was being used as a “tool for social engineering.”225

216. DEFENSE ADVISORY COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE SERVS., DACOWITS HISTORY OF
RECOMMENDATIONS - SPRING CONFERENCE 1993 (1993), https://dacowits.defense.gov/Reports-Meetings/
1993-Spring [https://perma.cc/LEL8-QK22].
217. See Hasday, supra note 208, at 140.
218. See Eric Schmitt, Change at the Pentagon; Aspin Resigns from Cabinet; President Lost
Confidence in Defense Chief, Aides Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1993, at A1.
219. See Briefing by Secretary of Defense William Perry and Assistant Secretary for Economic
Security Joshua Gotbaum Concerning the Military Housing Initiative, FED. NEWS SERV. (May 8, 1995).
220. Philip Shenon, New Finding on Mixing Sexes in Military, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1998, at A12.
221. Remarks by Sec’y of Def. William S. Cohen & Gen. Henry H. Shelton, USA, Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 15, 1998).
222. Avika Dua, Interview: Gen. James Cartwright on the Relationship Between Presidents and
Generals, HARV. POL. REV. (Oct. 21, 2013), https://harvardpolitics.com/interviews/interview-gen-jamescartwright-on-the-relationship-between-presidents-and-generals/ [https://perma.cc/6M9X-8LXS].
223. Id.
224. Jack Spencer, Time to Review the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services,
HERITAGE FOUND. EXEC. MEMORANDUM, no. 739, Apr. 17, 2001, at 1.
225. Ann McFeatters, Advances by Women in Military May Have Slowed Since Gulf War,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Sept. 29, 2002), http://old.post-gazette.com/nation/20020929military
women3.asp [https://perma.cc/KX6E-WFVK].
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DACOWITS receded into the background during the administration of George
W. Bush. According to a critical report by the office of Congresswoman Carolyn
Maloney, a New York Democrat, the new administration “effectively silenced”
DACOWITS in President Bush’s first year by “canceling all meetings, conferences, and installation visits and failing to appoint a new chair.”226 Under FACA, an
advisory committee’s charter can last only two years unless renewed, and in
February 2002, the Defense Department allowed DACOWITS’s charter to expire
for the first time in more than a half-century.227 The department reconstituted
DACOWITS the following month,228 but the new charter substantially limited
the committee’s resources and potential influence. The number of committee
members was cut from around thirty-five during DACOWITS’s first half-century
to a maximum of fifteen.229 The committee’s support staff was reduced from
thirty to six.230 The new charter also narrowed the committee’s scope significantly: before, it had advised the Defense Secretary “on the full range of matters
relating to women in the services,” now it was limited to advising on matters
“specified” by Defense Department officials.231 Meetings and base visits were
scaled back as well.232 By the end of Bush’s second term, according to one
scholar, the committee “had been allowed to almost disappear,” and only five of
its positions were occupied.233
The partisan cycle continues. The Obama Administration announced during its
first term that it would expand DACOWITS,234 and by President Obama’s last
full year in office, the committee’s charter authorized twenty positions, nineteen
of which were filled.235 Since President Trump took office, the committee’s estimated budget has decreased by nearly ten percent,236 and the number of positions
filled has decreased by three.237 To be sure, the scaling back of DACOWITS
under the Trump Administration has been less dramatic than under President
George W. Bush. Still, DACOWITS’s activities reflect an ebb-and-flow pattern,
226. OFFICE OF CONGRESSWOMAN CAROLYN B. MALONEY, THE DOWNGRADING OF DACOWITS:
HOW PRESIDENT BUSH HAS FAILED AMERICA’S WOMEN IN UNIFORM 5 (2004).
227. See Obradovic, supra note 211, at 100. Conservative groups initially celebrated the charter
expiration. See, e.g., Demise of DACOWITS, CTR. FOR MILITARY READINESS (Apr. 15, 2002), https://
www.cmrlink.org/issues/full/demise-of-the-dacowits [https://perma.cc/32PT-R6NJ].
228. See Demise of DACOWITS, supra note 227.
229. OFFICE OF CONGRESSWOMAN CAROLYN B. MALONEY, supra note 226.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 6.
232. Id. at 5, 7.
233. Obradovic, supra note 211, at 100.
234. Michele S. Jones, Advisory Committee Expanded to Meet the Needs of Women in the Armed
Forces, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (June 11, 2010, 12:31 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/
2010/06/11/advisory-committee-expanded-meet-needs-women-armed-forces [https://perma.cc/U58HSZYA].
235. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEFENSE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN THE SERVICES
(DACOWITS), 2016 ANNUAL REPORT app. at A-2, C-1–C-13 (2016).
236. Compare id. at A-2 ($975,000), with U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEFENSE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
WOMEN IN THE SERVICES (DACOWITS), 2018 ANNUAL REPORT app. at A-1 (2018) ($900,000).
237. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEFENSE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN THE SERVICES
(DACOWITS), supra note 236, app. at C-1–C-14.
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with a larger role for the committee under recent Democratic administrations
than under recent Republican administrations.
The ideological orientation of the committee’s members also tracks that of the
party in power. Figure 3 displays the median CF Scores for newly appointed
DACOWITS members during fiscal years 1997 through 2017. (Recall that CF
Scores are ideological preference estimates based on individuals’ records of political contributions. The scores are aligned on a 2 to 2, liberal-to-conservative
scale.) Each two-year span (for example, FY 2013–2014) is consolidated as a
mark placed at the latter year.238 When no new appointees were seated on
DACOWITS during a given two-year window, no mark is placed.
Figure 3: New Appointees to DACOWITS

The figure tends to show that new DACOWITS members are more liberal during Democratic administrations and more conservative during Republican administrations. That appointees during the first years of the George W. Bush
and Trump Administrations do not differ materially from their immediate predecessors’ appointees may suggest that cleaning house at DACOWITS is not the

238. For ease of interpretation, the years of Democratic control are denoted as circles, and the years
of Republican control are denoted as triangles. The bars emanating from each mark signify one median
absolute deviation both above and below the median. Also, note that fiscal years, which run from
October 1 through September 30, do not align with presidential transitions, which during this period
occurred on January 20 of 2001, 2009, and 2017.
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first priority for incoming Republican defense secretaries, though they ultimately
do so.
The DACOWITS saga both tracks the shallow state model and sheds light on
its dynamics. Career officials at the Defense Department and the individual
armed services are, according to the estimates above from Professor Clinton and
his collaborators,239 the most conservative careerists anywhere in the Executive
Branch. The preference divergence between political appointees and career officials at the Defense Department is thus likely to be largest in a Democratic
administration. Indeed, those are exactly the times when we see DACOWITS
play a significant role in shaping military gender integration policy. The
DACOWITS case study also highlights that advisory committees can do more
than provide technical expertise. Through meetings across the country with individuals and groups affected by administration policies, advisory committee members act as force multipliers, and, in Secretary Perry’s words, additional “eyes
and ears,” for political appointees whose own time and attention are divided
among an array of issues.240
B. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CHILDHOOD LEAD
POISONING PREVENTION

The interactions among Bush Administration appointees, career civil servants
at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and advisory committee members during the early 2000s childhood lead poisoning controversy
present—if anything—a starker illustration of the shallow state model in action
than the DACOWITS case study above. The controversy centered around the
Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention, a panel formed
by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to advise the HHS
Secretary, Assistant Secretary for Health, and Director of the CDC on scientific
issues related to lead in children.241 In 1991, acting on the advisory committee’s
recommendation, the CDC established a new threshold intervention level for
childhood lead poisoning: 10 micrograms per deciliter, significantly below the
previous threshold of 25 micrograms per deciliter.242 With mounting evidence
that lead levels below 10 micrograms per deciliter posed health risks to children,
a senior scientist at the CDC told reporters a year and a half into President
239. See supra Figure 1.
240. See supra note 219.
241. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., PUB. HEALTH SERV., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, CHARTER: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING PREVENTION (2011),
https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/ACCLPP/ACCLPP_2011_charter-Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/K63BEMDH]. The committee’s most recent charter expired in October 2013. See Advisory Committee on
Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention (ACCLPP), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/advisory/acclpp.htm [https://perma.cc/X8T7-V7LH] (last reviewed
July 30, 2019). The CDC is an agency within HHS.
242. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, PREVENTING LEAD POISONING IN YOUNG
CHILDREN (Oct. 1, 1991), https://wonder.cdc.gov/wonder/prevguid/p0000029/p0000029.asp [https://
perma.cc/8UVH-T8CU]; see also Martha Shirk, Lead Standard to Have Big Impact, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Aug. 4, 1991, at 1A (discussing advisory committee’s influence on CDC standard).
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George W. Bush’s first term that the advisory committee was likely to recommend a lower threshold and that the CDC was likely to follow that advice.243
President Bush’s HHS Secretary, Tommy Thompson, responded promptly.
Secretary Thompson rejected three nominees who had been proposed for the advisory panel by CDC officials,244 including one well-known public health expert
who had recently published a paper in a peer-reviewed journal concluding that
blood lead concentrations below 5 micrograms per deciliter were associated with
deficits in cognitive functioning and academic achievement.245 Instead,
Thompson appointed a clinical professor of pediatrics who had served as an
expert witness for manufacturers in lead paint litigation246 as well as a pediatric
hematologist who acknowledged that his name had been chosen by “someone
from the lead industry.”247 Another one of Thompson’s nominees, a scientist at
an environmental consulting firm, withdrew after then-Congressman Ed Markey,
a Massachusetts Democrat, revealed that ten of the firm’s clients had recently
reported releases of lead or lead compounds into the air, land, or surface
waters.248
The reconstituted advisory committee published its final report in 2005.
Although acknowledging “adverse health effects in children with blood levels
less than [10 micrograms per deciliter],” the committee recommended against
lowering the intervention threshold.249 The committee cited several factors supporting this recommendation. First, the committee said that it was “critical to
focus available resources where the potential adverse effects remain the greatest,”
which would be at blood lead levels above 10 micrograms per deciliter. Second,
it said that “[i]f no threshold level exists for adverse health effects,” setting a new
level below 10 micrograms per deciliter would be “based on an arbitrary decision.”250 Finally, the committee said that the “feasibility and effectiveness” of
interventions to address blood lead levels below 10 micrograms per deciliter had
“not been demonstrated.”251
The committee’s report supplied the Bush Administration’s HHS with the
arguments it needed to delay action on lead levels, but after President Obama

243. See Bill Lambrecht, U.S. Weighs Lowering Acceptable Lead Level in Children, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, July 8, 2002, at A1 (quoting Dr. Richard Jackson, director of the CDC’s National Center for
Environmental Health).
244. See GERALD MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER, LEAD WARS: THE POLITICS OF SCIENCE AND THE
FATE OF AMERICA’S CHILDREN 224–25 (2013).
245. See Bruce P. Lanphear et al., Cognitive Deficits Associated with Blood Lead Concentrations
<10 Microg/Dl in US Children and Adolescents, 115 PUB. HEALTH REP. 521, 528 (2000).
246. See MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, supra note 244, at 225.
247. See Aaron Zitner, Advisors Put Under a Microscope, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2002, at A1.
248. See Gerald Markowitz & David Rosner, Politicizing Science: The Case of the Bush
Administration’s Influence on the Lead Advisory Panel at the Centers for Disease Control, 24 J. PUB.
HEALTH POL’Y 105, 117, 127 n.39 (2003).
249. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ADVISORY COMM. ON CHILDHOOD LEAD
POISONING PREVENTION, PREVENTING LEAD POISONING IN YOUNG CHILDREN, at ix (2005).
250. Id.
251. Id.
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took office, the agency reversed course. In 2012, HHS adopted the advisory committee’s recommendation to lower the blood lead level standard for children from
10 micrograms per deciliter to 5 micrograms per deciliter.252 By this point, the
Thompson appointees no longer served on the panel.253
Once again, CF scores for appointees track the partisan ebb-and-flow narrative,
as illustrated in Figure 4.254
Figure 4: New Appointees to the Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead
Poisoning Prevention

The story of the Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead Poisoning
Prevention appears to be a straightforward case of the shallow state model in
action. The Bush Administration—with its ideological inclination against stricter

252. Anemona Hartocollis, C.D.C. Lowers Recommended Lead-Level Limits in Children, N.Y.
TIMES, May 16, 2012, at A24; see CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ADVISORY COMM. ON
CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING PREVENTION, LOW LEVEL LEAD EXPOSURE HARMS CHILDREN: A
RENEWED CALL FOR PRIMARY PREVENTION 6 (2012). The CDC also followed the advisory committee’s
recommendation to shift from setting “blood lead levels of concern” to identifying “reference values.”
Id. at ix, 5. A blood lead level above the reference value “should trigger an environmental investigation
to evaluate potential sources of exposure.” Id. at 43.
253. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ADVISORY COMM. ON CHILDHOOD LEAD
POISONING PREVENTION, supra note 252, at iv-v.
254. As before, the median CF Score for each two-year span is represented by a mark placed at the
later year. The bars emanating signify one median absolute deviation both above and below the median.
When no new appointees were seated during a given two-year period, no mark is placed.
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regulation255 and ties to the lead industry256—found itself at odds with CDC officials who wanted to lower the blood lead level of concern. It responded by adding
sympathetic experts to an advisory committee, who in turn produced a report that
supplied the administration with reasons to resist regulation. Here, the shallow
state did its job.
C. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FAMILY
RESIDENTIAL CENTERS

In late 2013 and early 2014, the United States experienced a sudden increase
in the number of children and families attempting to cross its southern border
with Mexico. The number of unaccompanied children apprehended at the border increased by seventy-seven percent in fiscal year 2014 (October 2013 to
September 2014) over the previous twelve months, and the number of families
increased more than threefold.257 The Obama Administration responded by
opening family detention centers in Texas and Pennsylvania—reviving a controversial and largely abandoned practice.258 It soon came under criticism from
academics,259 human rights advocates,260 and congressional Democrats,261 all
of whom warned about the long-term effects of detention-related trauma on
children. A federal district judge in Los Angeles ruled that the Obama
Administration’s policy violated a 1997 consent decree and ordered the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to release children “without
unnecessary delay,” which, in many cases, meant releasing parents who had
been detained with children.262 DHS was slow to implement the order, and criticism of the administration continued.263

255. See, e.g., Kevin Drum, Bush and Lead, WASH. MONTHLY (Mar. 5, 2004), https://
washingtonmonthly.com/2004/03/05/bush-and-lead [https://perma.cc/LNT8-9NA6].
256. See, e.g., Markowitz & Rosner, supra note 248, at 123 (noting Bush Interior Secretary Gale
Norton’s past as a lobbyist for the lead industry).
257. See Dara Lind, The 2014 Central American Migrant Crisis, VOX (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.
vox.com/2014/10/10/18088638/child-migrant-crisis-unaccompanied-alien-children-rio-grande-valleyobama-immigration [https://perma.cc/K366-V37E].
258. See Franco Ordo~
nez, U.S Looks to Detain More Mother, Child Migrants, Sometimes for Months,
MCCLATCHY DC (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/article
24779941.html [https://perma.cc/F7PS-J6F8].
259. See, e.g., Alfonso Gonzales et al., Why We Need to End Family Detention—Again, POLITICO
MAG. (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/03/family-detention-centersborder-crisis-116521 [https://perma.cc/5JCS-6A6L].
260. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, U.S. DETENTION OF FAMILIES SEEKING ASYLUM: A ONE-YEAR
UPDATE 1 (2015), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/hrf-one-yr-family-detention-report.
pdf [https://perma.cc/93JM-D5JK].
261. See Letter from Rep. Zoe Lofgren et al. to Sec’y Jeh Johnson, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security
(July 31, 2015), https://lofgren.house.gov/sites/lofgren.house.gov/files/migrated/UploadedFiles/DHS_
Family_Detention_Letter_7.31.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9GQ-AK9G].
262. See Flores v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 3d 864, 886–87 (C.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d in part and rev’d in
part, 828 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2016).
263. See Dora Schriro, Weeping in the Playtime of Others: The Obama Administration’s Failed
Reform of ICE Family Detention Practices, 5 J. MIGRATION & HUMAN SEC. 452, 464 (2017).
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In June 2015, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson announced that he and Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Director Sarah Salda~na would appoint an advisory committee to counsel DHS regarding family detention facilities.264 The fourteen individuals appointed to the Advisory Committee on Family Residential
Centers (ACFRC) included two physicians, several more public health experts,
four law school faculty members, and a former Democratic congressman.265 The
ACFRC did not, incidentally, include anyone identifiably associated with the
Republican Party.266 Of the ten members who have made campaign contributions
captured by the Federal Election Commission database, all have given exclusively to Democrats, generating a median CF score of 1.097.267 The other four
included a senior researcher at a San Francisco education nonprofit,268 an immigrant rights advocate,269 an official at the American Academy of Pediatrics,270
and a Washington, D.C.-based criminal justice consultant with a specialty in
prison rape elimination strategy.271
The committee clashed repeatedly with ICE careerists. According to one committee member, ICE sought to prohibit discussion on certain sensitive topics and
curtailed the committee’s access to documents that members needed in order to
carry out their charge.272 The committee, therefore, looked to other sources—
including information from nongovernmental organizations, federal court filings,
and individual members’ experiences—in writing its final report.273 The report
was highly critical of ICE policies and practices. The committee said that ICE
was applying “different and arbitrary” criteria for the release of mothers with
children and fathers with children “with insufficient justification.”274 It questioned ICE’s “commitments to mitigating psychological trauma and creating a

264. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary Jeh C. Johnson on Family
Residential Centers (June 24, 2015), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/06/24/statement-secretary-jeh-cjohnson-family-residential-centers [https://perma.cc/BV2Y-8F4N].
265. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., REPORT OF THE ICE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FAMILY
RESIDENTIAL CENTERS app. at 154 (Oct. 7, 2016) [hereinafter ACFRC REPORT], https://www.ice.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/Report/2016/acfrc-report-final-102016.pdf [https://perma.cc/YMJ2-ZSDG].
266. See id.
267. Those nine are: William Arroyo, Howard Berman, Karen Musalo, Jennifer Nagada, Leslye
Orloff, Sonia Parras-Konrad, Andres Pumariega, Margo Schlanger, Dora Schriro, and Kurt Schwarz.
268. See About Us—Staff—BethAnn Berliner, WESTED, https://www.wested.org/personnel/bethannberliner [https://perma.cc/9BY4-QWZT] (last visited July 26, 2019).
269. See Our Staff—Michelle Brane´, WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N, https://www.womensrefugee
commission.org/about/staff/173-migrant-rights-justice/1791-michelle-brane [https://perma.cc/U3DT-RP7T]
(last visited July 26, 2019).
270. See Executive Staff, AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, https://www.aap.org/en-us/about-the-aap/aapleadership/Pages/Executive-Staff.aspx [https://perma.cc/39G3-LL6F] (last visited July 26, 2019) (Judy
Dolins).
271. See The TMG Team, MOSS GROUP, INC., https://www.mossgroup.us/who-we-are/tmg-team
[https://perma.cc/3PKW-BDS2] (last visited July 26, 2019) (Andie Moss).
272. Schriro, supra note 263, at 465.
273. See ACFRC REPORT, supra note 265, at 1–2.
274. Id. at 16.
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safe residential environment.”275 It criticized the lack of “cultural competence”
among ICE staff.276 And it blasted the agency’s unwillingness to disclose “basic information” about detainees that state and local agencies “routinely” provide.277 The committee called for a prompt end to family detention except in
“rare cases when necessary . . . to mitigate individualized flight risk or
danger.”278
The advisory committee approved its final report in October 2016, just
weeks before Donald Trump’s election. Far from following the committee’s
recommendations, the Trump Administration adopted an explicit policy of
family detention.279 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Trump Administration never
convened a committee meeting and has allowed the committee’s charter to
expire.280
In the last respect, the ACFRC story is broadly consistent with the shallow state
model. The careerists at the Homeland Security Department are among the most
conservative civil servants in the Executive Branch,281 and policy toward families
crossing the border has proven to be particularly polarizing. Preference divergence between political appointees and civil servants—especially on this issue—
was likely greater under the Obama Administration than under the Trump
Administration, and the former, but not the latter, utilized ACFRC in response to
that preference divergence. Equally importantly, the ACFRC case study highlights the shallow state’s principal weaknesses. Advisory committee members’
access to information depends in part on the cooperation of careerists, who may
have an incentive to stonewall. And although advisory committee members can
sometimes play a role in policy implementation—as in the DACOWITS case discussed above282—that role is circumscribed by resource constraints and a lack of
formal authority.
D. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY CLEAN AIR SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE

The prior three case studies show how political appointees in the last three
administrations have attempted to use advisory committees as counterweights to
careerists—with varying degrees of success. The pattern continues under the
Trump Administration. Activists and media organizations have noted a number
of instances in which the Administration appears to have stacked advisory

275. Id. at 26.
276. Id. at 36.
277. Id. at 39.
278. Id. at 2.
279. See Dara Lind, It’s Official: The Trump Administration Has Replaced Family Separation with
Indefinite Family Detention, VOX (June 30, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/6/30/17520820/familiestogether-detention-separate-camp-military [https://perma.cc/4X8N-RYKZ].
280. See Meetings, Advisory Committee on Family Residential Centers (ACFRC), IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/acfrc [https://perma.cc/QMQ8-3QVA] (last updated Jan. 3, 2018).
281. See supra Figure 1.
282. See supra Section IV.A.
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committees with ideological allies—including at the State Department,283 the
Agriculture Department,284 and the Interior Department.285 But no agency has
drawn more attention—or uproar—than the EPA, where changes to the composition of the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) have elicited concerns from environmentalists as well as congressional Democrats.286
Unlike the three committees in the prior case studies—all of which were established by agency initiatives—CASAC is a creature of Congress’s creation. The
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 mandate that the EPA review its national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards every five years, and the statute
requires the EPA Administrator to appoint and consult a seven-member “independent scientific review committee” as part of its quinquennial process.287 The
statute also sets forth specific criteria for committee membership: the panel must
include at least one member of the National Academy of Sciences, one physician,
and one person representing state air pollution control agencies.288 An accompanying report from the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
notes that committee members “anticipated” that all seven members would be
“selected on the basis of their special expertise in . . . toxicology, epidemiology

283. Two State Department advisory committees have become flashpoints for controversy: the
Commission on Unalienable Rights, see Tim Fitzsimons, Trump Administration’s New Human Rights
Commission Alarms LGBTQ Advocates, NBC NEWS (July 10, 2019, 7:20 PM), https://www.nbcnews.
com/feature/nbc-out/trump-administration-s-new-human-rights-commission-alarms-lgbtq-advocatesn1028276 [https://perma.cc/HSG9-EK5P], and the Cultural Property Advisory Committee, where the
one Native American member was replaced by a campaign finance lawyer whose clients include the
Trump Organization, see Maxine Speier, Trump Removed the Only Native American Member from
the Cultural Property Advisory Committee, PAC. STANDARD (July 17, 2019), https://psmag.com/
news/trump-removed-the-only-native-american-member-from-the-cultural-property-advisory-committee
[https://perma.cc/ZC84-T8ZH].
284. The Union of Concerned Scientists has charged that the 2020 Dietary Guidelines Advisory
Committee, which counsels Agriculture Department as well as HHS on their once-every-half-decade
update to nutritional standards, is heavily weighted toward meat and supplement industry interests. See
Derrick Z. Jackson, Food Companies at the Table in Trump Administration’s Dietary Guidelines
Committee, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS: BLOG (Apr. 1, 2019, 11:02 AM), https://blog.ucsusa.org/
derrick-jackson/trump-administrations-dietary-guidelines-committee [https://perma.cc/63JY-HTDC].
285. An environmental organization filed a lawsuit in August 2018 challenging the establishment and
operation of the Royalty Policy Committee, a panel advising the Interior Department, which the plaintiff
group said was tilted toward oil and gas industry interests; a district court dismissed the challenge to the
panel’s composition but allowed other FACA claims to proceed. See W. Org. of Res. Councils v.
Bernhardt, 362 F. Supp. 3d 900, 904, 916 (D. Mont. 2019). The Interior Department allowed the
committee’s charter to expire in April 2019. See Nate Hegyi, Trump Administration Abandons
Controversial Oil and Gas Advisory Committee, KUER: MOUNTAIN WEST NEWS BUREAU (May 1,
2019), https://www.kuer.org/post/trump-administration-abandons-controversial-oil-and-gas-advisorycommittee#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/6TX3-83N3].
286. See Press Release, Envtl. Def. Fund, House Hearing Highlights New GAO Finding that Trump
EPA Interfered in Selection of Science Advisors (July 16, 2019), https://www.edf.org/media/househearing-highlights-new-gao-finding-trump-epa-interfered-selection-science-advisors [https://perma.cc/
AT62-DK5G].
287. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1)–(2) (2012).
288. Id. § 7409(d)(2)(A).
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and/or clinical medicine, or in the fields of environmental or ecological systems.”289 The report adds that the committee is “intended to have complete
independence.”290
Since its creation, CASAC has played an important role in developing national
ambient air quality standards, participating at several stages of the process. For
each pollutant subject to an air quality standard, the five-year review entails a
structured sequence in which civil servants issue four technical reports, culminating in a determination by the EPA Administrator to retain or revise the current
standards.291 The proposed rule then is subject to several rounds of interagency
review and public comment. Following the issuance of each draft report, CASAC
has an opportunity to provide input, which civil servants then seek to integrate
into the final version.292 At the end of the process, the EPA Administrator can
review the full paper trail detailing the back-and-forth between CASAC and civil
servants.293
The critique from environmentalists and congressional Democrats that the
Trump Administration has stocked CASAC with its ideological allies is in some
ways unsurprising; CASAC’s membership has long reflected the political orientation of the party in power. Figure 5 displays the now-familiar median CF scores
for new committee members appointed between fiscal years 1997 and 2017. As
the figure shows, CASAC evidences a liberal orientation during the Clinton
Administration, shifts rightward during the George W. Bush years, and then
reverts to its liberal posture during Obama’s presidency.

289. H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 183 (1977).
290. Id. at 182.
291. See Process of Reviewing the National Ambient Air Quality Standards, ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants/process-reviewing-national-ambient-air-qualitystandards [https://perma.cc/5W23-T876] (last visited July 28, 2016). These reports are: an integrated
review plan, integrated science assessment, risk/exposure assessment, and policy assessment, and each
report is submitted at least once to CASAC for review. Id. The reports are produced by civil servants
deep in the agency’s hierarchy: the National Center for Environmental Assessment (a sub-unit within
the Office of Research and Development) produces the integrated science assessment; the Office of Air
Quality Planning and Standards (a sub-unit within the Office of Air and Radiation) produces the risk/
exposure assessment and the policy assessment; and the two collaborate on the integrated review
assessment that kicks off the process. See, e.g., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT INTEGRATED REVIEW
PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR PARTICULATE MATTER 1-6 to 1-7
(2016). Both the National Center for Environmental Assessment and the Office of Air Quality Planning
and Standards are headed by career civil servants. S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS, 114TH CONG., 2D SESS., UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: POLICY AND SUPPORTING POSITIONS
158 (Comm. Print 2016); About the Director of EPA’s National Center for Environmental Assessment
(NCEA), ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/aboutepa/aboutdirector-epas-national-center-environmental-assessment-ncea_.html [https://perma.cc/8CK4-BTRT]
(last visited July 28, 2019).
292. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT INTEGRATED REVIEW PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL AMBIENT
AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR PARTICULATE MATTER, supra note 291, at 1–5 tbl.1-1.
293. Id.
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Figure 5: New Appointees to CASAC

Nevertheless, interactions between EPA civil servants and Republicanappointed CASAC members have not always been conflictual. Sheila Jasanoff,
reflecting on CASAC’s role in the Reagan years, wrote that the committee had
“established a fundamentally sympathetic working relationship with agency
staff.”294 Although the George W. Bush Administration added members to
CASAC whose campaign contributions suggest a more conservative bent than
the generally liberal EPA staff (see Figure 5), CASAC members and EPA civil
servants nonetheless found themselves on the same side of standard-setting
debates.295

294. JASANOFF, supra note 5, at 121.
295. For example, CASAC and EPA staff both proposed more stringent standards for fine particulate
matter (PM2.5) early in President Bush’s second term. See ROBERT ESWORTHY & JAMES E. MCCARTHY,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33254, AIR QUALITY: EPA’S 2006 CHANGES TO THE PARTICULATE MATTER
(PM) STANDARDS 18 (2008). And both suggested a primary ozone standard as low as sixty parts per
billion in 2007. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R-07-007, REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL AMBIENT
AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR OZONE: POLICY ASSESSMENT OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
INFORMATION 6-86 (2007) (staff recommendation); id. at attachment B, at 2 (CASAC recommendation);
see also Bob Weinhold, Ozone Nation: EPA Standard Panned by the People, 116 ENVTL HEALTH
PERSP. A302 (2008) (noting general agreement between CASAC and agency staff). In both cases, EPA
Administrator Stephen Johnson rejected the advice of CASAC and the EPA careerists, choosing a less
stringent standard for PM2.5 and setting the primary ozone level at seventy-five parts per billion. See
ESWORTHY & MCCARTHY, supra at 17–18; see also Shahrzod Hanizavareh, Affirming the Status Quo?
Regulating the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 559, 602–03
(2009).
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CASAC returned to the limelight after President Trump took office, and this
time, its interactions with political appointees and agency staff have been much
more in line with the shallow state model. President Trump’s first EPA
Administrator, Scott Pruitt, immediately and unsurprisingly found himself at
odds with the agency’s career staff. Pruitt’s official biography on the Oklahoma
Attorney General website described him as “a leading advocate against the
EPA’s activist agenda,”296 and EPA careerists were none too happy about their
new boss. One retiring EPA official described “staff openly dismissing and mocking the environmental policies” of the Trump Administration and Pruitt.297 The
president of a union representing over 9,000 EPA civil servants charged that
“Pruitt’s assault on clean air risks our ability to safeguard children’s health” and
“address climate change.”298
Unlikely to find support from EPA career staff in implementing his deregulatory agenda, Pruitt turned to CASAC and other similar panels for advice and
expertise—exactly as the shallow state model would predict. He began by making several changes to the panel’s membership. In October 2017, he chose Tony
Cox—a private-sector consultant whose past clients include Exxon Mobil and the
American Petroleum Institute299—to chair the panel, replacing a well-known

To the extent that CASAC clashed with anyone during the George W. Bush years, it was with EPA
Administrator Johnson rather than with the agency rank-and-file. Johnson even considered curtailing
CASAC’s role in the standard-setting process by eliminating the committee’s ability to give input on the
civil servants’ last report before publication. See ESWORTHY & MCCARTHY, supra at 2. EPA
Administrators Scott Pruitt and Andrew Wheeler would ultimately adopt this proposal under President
Trump. See Letter from Andrew R. Wheeler, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Louis Anthony Cox, Jr.,
Chair, Clean Air Scientific Advisory Comm. 2 (July 25, 2019) [hereinafter Wheeler Letter], https://
yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/0/6CBCBBC3025E13B4852583D90047B352/$File/EPA-CASAC19-002_Response.pdf [https://perma.cc/TD2E-EFQY] (calling for “simultaneous review” of EPA policy
assessment by CASAC and public); Memorandum from E. Scott Pruitt, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to
Ass’t Adm’rs, Back-to-Basics Process for Reviewing National Ambient Air Quality Standards 9, 10 fig.1
(May 9, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-05/documents/image2018-05-09173219.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KJV-2USB].
Johnson’s clashes with CASAC are especially interesting because Johnson himself was a veteran
EPA scientist who was respected among environmentalists prior to his appointment, despite his
promotion by a deregulatory Republican administration. See Felicity Barringer, E.P.A. Scientist Is
Bush’s Pick as New Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2005, at A1.
296. About the Attorney General, OK.GOV, https://web.archive.org/web/20170108114336/https://
www.ok.gov/oag/Media/About_the_AG [https://perma.cc/M6XL-PMAJ] (last visited July 29, 2019).
297. Hal Bernton, Retiring Seattle EPA Staffer Blasts New Leadership on His Way Out, SEATTLE
TIMES (Apr. 12, 2017, 3:34 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/retiringseattle-epa-staffer-blasts-new-leadership-on-his-way-out [https://perma.cc/KGY4-USXX].
298. John J. O’Grady, Don’t Be Diverted by Scott Pruitt’s Ethics Scandals: The Real Harm He’s
Causing Is to the Environment and Public Health, ALTERNET (Apr. 13, 2018), www.alternet.org/
environment/dont-be-diverted-scott-pruitts-ethics-scandals-real-harm-hes-causing-environment-and
[https://perma.cc/ET8Z-D8UQ].
299. See Jean Chemnick, Meet 7 Science Advisers Under Trump, E&E NEWS (July 24, 2019), https://
www.eenews.net/stories/1060780563 [https://perma.cc/WA2J-637N]; Eli Stokols, EPA Bars Scientists
It Funds From Advisory Roles, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 31, 2017, 6:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
epa-bars-scientists-it-funds-from-advisory-roles-1509487548.
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academic epidemiologist whose term was expiring.300 That same month, he
announced that scientists receiving EPA grants would no longer be eligible to sit
on CASAC or other scientific advisory panels—a policy that led to the departure
of two more committee members and thus two more openings for Pruitt to fill.301
Then, in April 2018, President Trump sent a memo to Pruitt calling on the EPA to
“reduc[e] unnecessary impediments to new manufacturing and business expansion.”302 In an unusual show of specificity, the President expressly mentioned
CASAC as a body with a role in carrying out that agenda.303
Pruitt resigned in July 2018 and was replaced by Andrew Wheeler, a former
coal lobbyist who appears to share Pruitt’s pro-industry bent.304 Wheeler soon had
an opportunity to utilize CASAC to counter EPA civil servants and further the
Trump Administration’s deregulatory objectives. In October 2018, EPA civil servants involved in reviewing the national ambient air quality standard for particulate
matter released an assessment finding that long-term exposure to particulate matter
is likely to cause cancer (among other health effects).305 That conclusion went further than their previous assessment, which stopped short of declaring a causal
link.306 It counseled in favor of greater regulation of emissions—not the direction
that the Trump Administration appeared to be urging.
Shortly before the civil servants’ assessment was released, Wheeler disbanded a
CASAC-affiliated auxiliary panel comprising a mix of Pruitt appointees and
Obama Administration holdovers that had aided CASAC in its review of EPA’s
particulate matter assessments.307 Once the auxiliary panel was terminated,
CASAC’s seven members became the sole outside advisers charged with vetting
the particulate-matter standard.308 Wheeler then cleaned house at CASAC, replacing every committee member except Cox and one other individual—Mark
Frampton, a University of Rochester pulmonologist with no obvious political ties
whose presence on the panel satisfied the requirement that one member be a
300. Frank Kummer, Drexel Dean, Former EPA Science Advisory Chair, Blasts New Pruitt ‘Ethics’
Rule, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/health/environment/epa-scottpruitt-drexel-ethics-federal-grants-20171103.html [https://perma.cc/4TQG-LPDB].
301. See Lila Thulin, Here’s the Expertise Scott Pruitt Is Removing From the EPA’s Advisory
Boards, SLATE (Nov. 2, 2017), https://slate.com/technology/2017/11/a-list-of-expertise-scott-pruitt-isremoving-from-the-epa.html [https://perma.cc/R9PY-KA87].
302. Memorandum for the Administrator of the Envtl. Prot. Agency, 2018, 83 Fed. Reg. 16,761,
16,762 (Apr. 16, 2018).
303. Id. at 16,764.
304. See Timothy Cama, New EPA Chief Draws Sharp Contrast to Pruitt, HILL (July 15, 2018),
https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/396985-new-epa-chief-draws-sharp-contrast-to-pruitt
[https://perma.cc/VZ6H-STKY].
305. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INTEGRATED SCIENCE ASSESSMENT FOR PARTICULATE MATTER 10-1
(2018), https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/isa/recordisplay.cfm?deid=341593 [https://perma.cc/7NP6-WMG3].
306. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INTEGRATED SCIENCE ASSESSMENT FOR PARTICULATE MATTER 7-68
(2009), https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/isa/recordisplay.cfm?deid=216546 [https://perma.cc/CCF8-5XFH].
307. Sean Reilly, Trump’s EPA Scraps Air Pollution Science Review Panels, SCIENCE MAG. (Oct. 12,
2018), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/10/trump-s-epa-scraps-air-pollution-science-reviewpanels [https://perma.cc/6DUJ-S266].
308. Lisa Friedman, E.P.A. to Disband a Key Scientific Review Panel on Air Pollution, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/climate/epa-disbands-pollution-science-panel.html.
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physician.309 Four of Wheeler’s five appointees work for state environmental
agencies in Republican-controlled states.310 One of them—Sabine Lange, a toxicologist at the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality—had previously
criticized EPA staff for concluding that a lower ozone standard would produce
health benefits, a conclusion that Lange and her colleagues questioned.311 Another
Wheeler appointee, Utah Division of Air Quality toxicologist Steve Packham, had
previously questioned the lung-related health impacts of fine particulate matter.312
Two months later, members of Wheeler’s CASAC released a detailed 114page response to the civil servants’ assessment.313 As part of that response,
Chairman Cox pressed EPA staff to consider and cite studies of a coal ban in
Ireland that—in Cox’s view—suggested an ambiguous relationship between airborne particulate matter and mortality.314 Lange, the Texas toxicologist, provided
sixty-nine pages of critical commentary, including an argument that civil servants
failed to account for all possible confounders before asserting a causal link
between particulate matter and the incidence of cancer.315 CASAC amplified its
criticism of the career staff’s work in April 2019, stating that the staff did “not
provide a sufficiently comprehensive, systematic assessment of the available
science.”316
Wheeler’s role in selecting CASAC’s members notwithstanding, it would be a
mistake to conclude that the committee serves solely as the agency head’s mouthpiece. One member—the pulmonologist Frampton—has defended the EPA
staff’s particulate matter assessment and spoken out against Cox’s stewardship of
CASAC.317 And in April 2019, the full committee sent a letter to Wheeler asking

309. See Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Acting Administrator Wheeler Announces Science
Advisory for Key Clean Air Act Committee (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/actingadministrator-wheeler-announces-science-advisors-key-clean-air-act-committee [https://perma.cc/67VY8M5V].
310. See id.
311. See Bryan W. Shaw et al., Lowering the Ozone Standard Will Not Improve Public Health, EM
MAG., May 2015, at 26.
312. See Katie Peikes, Air Quality Impacts Health, Professor Says, HERALD J., (Jan. 25, 2016),
https://www.hjnews.com/allaccess/air-quality-impacts-health-professor-says/article_406e0713-fb38554c-a2f5-4efaf3c86092.html [https://perma.cc/ZHL4-7G5W] (quoting Packham).
313. EPA CLEAN AIR SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMM., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
PRELIMINARY COMMENTS FROM MEMBERS OF CASAC ON EPA’S INTEGRATED SCIENCE ASSESSMENT
FOR PARTICULATE MATTER (2018), https://www.eenews.net/assets/2018/12/11/document_gw_07.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SGN9-CY3P].
314. Id. at 9–10 (comments of Tony Cox).
315. Id. at 39, 84–89, 98 (comments of Lange). Packham, for his part, submitted only four pages of
comments that—he noted—had “been prepared in haste.” Id. at 111.
316. Letter from Louis Anthony Cox, Jr., Chair, CASAC., to Andrew R. Wheeler, Adm’r, EPA,
CASAC Review of the EPA’s Integrated Science Assessment for Particulate Matter 1 (Apr. 11, 2019)
[hereinafter Cox Letter], https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/LookupWebReportsLastMonth
CASAC/6CBCBBC3025E13B4852583D90047B352/$File/EPA-CASAC-19-002þ.pdf [https://perma.
cc/TDD7-7XQZ].
317. CASAC Research Scientist Attacks Panel Chairman’s NAAQS Review Shift, INSIDE EPA (Mar.
26, 2019), https://insideepa.com/daily-news/casac-research-scientist-attacks-panel-chairman%E2%80%
99s-naaqs-review-shift [https://perma.cc/Q7A8-T5M5].
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him to reappoint the particulate-matter auxiliary panel that he had dismissed several months earlier or else to “appoint a panel with similar expertise.”318 Wheeler
rebuffed that request three months later, instructing the committee to instead consult “subject matter expert consultants” on an “as needed” basis.319 Wheeler also
rejected CASAC’s request for more time to complete its review.320
Whether CASAC ultimately functions as an arrow in Wheeler’s quiver or a
thorn in his side remains to be seen.321 So far, though, the substantive advice from
CASAC members has been in line with what the shallow state model would predict. CASAC has provided a counterweight to the EPA staff, supplying arguments
that political appointees can potentially use to advance the administration’s agenda
over careerists’ objections.
E. TAKING STOCK

Our qualitative analysis in this Part presents two cases in which an advisory
committee served as a successful counterweight to careerists with divergent
preferences—the Clinton-era Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the
Services and the CDC Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead Poisoning
Prevention during George W. Bush’s presidency. The analysis also presents one
case, concerning the ICE Advisory Committee on Family Residential Centers
during the Obama years, that illustrates the limits on advisory committees’ ability
to effect change when faced with a committed, oppositional civil service. For the
fourth case, concerning the EPA Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee under
President Trump, it is too soon to say whether appointees will succeed in using
the committee to check their agency’s civil servants.
These outcomes do not, however, exhaust the full range of ways in which advisory committees can influence administration policy. Although we have emphasized that advisory committees can be counterweights to careerists, their role also
can be confirmatory. That is, a political appointee who is skeptical of the civil
service’s conclusions, but not in outright disbelief, may empanel an advisory
committee with ideologically sympathetic members to check bureaucrats’ work.
Under these circumstances, the fact that the advisory committee supported the
civil servants’ finding is not necessarily evidence of the committee’s irrelevance.
Rather, the committee’s confirmatory report may play an important role in persuading the political appointee to adopt the civil service’s recommendation.
318. Cox Letter, supra note 316, at 2.
319. Wheeler Letter, supra note 295, at 2.
320. Id.; see also Amena H. Saiyid, EPA Adamant That Air Standards Reviews Get Done by
December 2020, BLOOMBERG L. (July 26, 2019), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/
environment-and-energy/epa-adamant-that-air-standards-reviews-get-done-by-december-2020 [https://
perma.cc/KYT5-4K92].
321. Wheeler has set a goal for CASAC to complete its review of the EPA staff’s as-yet-released
policy assessments for particulate matter and ground-level ozone by the end of calendar year 2019. See
Wheeler Letter, supra note 295, at 2. That deadline sets an ambitious timetable that could cause strains
between the Administrator and the advisory committee. On Wheeler’s expedited schedule. See Jeff
Tollefson, Air Pollution Science Under Siege at US Environment Agency, NATURE (Mar. 28, 2019),
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-00937-w [https://perma.cc/Y3HJ-5VHA].
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Consider, for instance, the role that the EPA National Drinking Water
Advisory Council played in the EPA setting a new standard for arsenic in drinking water in 2001. In the waning days of the Clinton Administration, the EPA
announced a rule reducing the maximum allowable arsenic in drinking water
from fifty to ten parts per billion.322 Although Christine Todd Whitman, the newly
confirmed Bush Administration’s EPA Administrator, supported a reduction
from the old level, she voiced skepticism that the ten parts per billion cutoff—
developed by EPA civil servants during a Democratic administration323—
adequately considered implementation costs.324 Accordingly, she withdrew the
rule and ordered additional scientific reviews and a reopened public comment period.325 In August 2001, a National Drinking Water Advisory Council working
group released a report concluding that the civil servants “produced a credible
estimate of the cost of arsenic compliance.”326 By November, Whitman was convinced that the science behind the Clinton EPA’s rule was sound and announced
that the EPA would adopt the ten parts per billion level.327
The drinking water episode is, at a broad level, consonant with the story that
emerges from the four case studies above: across agencies, administrations, and
issues, advisory committees provide appointees with a potentially valuable alternative to civil servants as information providers. In some cases, advisory committees will enable appointees to move policy away from civil servants’ preferences
and toward their own. On other occasions, advisory committees may play a confirmatory role, helping an agency head decide to heed the advice of career staff.
Advisory committees will not always influence the outcomes of agency

322. Elizabeth Shogren, EPA Revokes New Arsenic Standards for Drinking Water, L.A. TIMES (Mar.
21, 2001), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2001-mar-21-mn-44369-story.html.
323. The rule was supported by economic and scientific analyses conducted by independent
consultants at the behest of the EPA Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water. See Arsenic in
Drinking Water Rule: Economic Analysis, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
dwreginfo/support-documents-final-arsenic-rule [https://perma.cc/9BZK-SGQ5] (last visited July 30,
2019); Analytical Methods Support Document for Arsenic in Drinking Water, ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/dwreginfo/support-documents-final-arsenic-rule
[https://perma.cc/
9BZK-SGQ5] (last visited July 30, 2019). That EPA office was then (as now) helmed by a career
bureaucrat. See GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, 2000 PLUM BOOK, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
GPO-PLUMBOOK-2000/pdf/GPO-PLUMBOOK-2000-7-22.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4C3-XUHP].
324. Shogren, supra note 322.
325. Id.
326. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REPORT OF THE ARSENIC COST WORKING GROUP TO THE NATIONAL
DRINKING WATER ADVISORY COUNCIL 2 (2001), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/
documents/2005_11_10_arsenic_ndwac-arsenic-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SKL-S7F7].
327. Katharine Q. Seelye, E.P.A. to Adopt Clinton Arsenic Standard, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2001, at
A18. Other potential influences on Whitman’s decision included a September 2001 report by the
National Research Council linking arsenic exposure to bladder and lung cancer as well as pressure from
members of Congress for more stringent arsenic standards. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ARSENIC IN
DRINKING WATER: 2001 UPDATE CH.1 (2001), https://www.nap.edu/read/10194/chapter/1 [https://
perma.cc/Q6H4-GBNE]; Douglas Jehl, House Demanding Strict Guidelines on Arsenic Levels,
N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2001, at A1; The Associated Press, Senate Backs New Standards for Arsenic
Levels, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2001, at A16.
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decisionmaking processes, but in some instances they will—and sometimes quite
profoundly.
V. IMPLICATIONS
Taken together, the quantitative evidence in Part III and case studies in Part IV
tell a coherent story: political appointees stack advisory committees with individuals who share the administration’s ideological inclinations and then use those
committees as counterweights to career civil servants whose preferences diverge
from the party in power. The fifth branch can thus be characterized as a shallow
state whose membership follows the political tides and whose members balance
the power of the so-called “deep state” of career civil servants. This shallow state
story has potentially profound—though nuanced—implications for the study and
practice of administrative law. We begin section V.A by examining the implications for congressional control of the administrative state. We then, in section V.B,
consider the import of our findings for “presidential administration”—defined by
then-Professor Elena Kagan as the “comparative primacy” of the Presidency “in
setting the direction and influencing the outcome of administrative process.”328
In section V.C, we ask what the existence of the shallow state means for judicial
review of administrative action. Finally, in section V.D, we consider how our
findings can contribute to the increasingly high-profile and high-stakes debate
over the internal separation of powers and the legitimacy of the administrative
state.
A. CONGRESS AND THE SHALLOW STATE

Perhaps most starkly, our findings challenge accounts of advisory committees
that characterize these panels as instruments of congressional control over administrative agencies. Recall that these “congressional control” accounts took two
forms: one that casts committees as “fire alarms” to alert current lawmakers of
agency activities (and thus aid in their oversight efforts), and another that conceives of committees as tools that allow Congress to “stack the deck” in favor of
certain interests at the time that legislation is enacted. In tension with the “firealarm” account, we find no evidence that the composition of advisory committees
reflects the preferences of the current Congress—if committees serve as monitors
for lawmakers, then they are unreliable fire alarms at best. And contrary to the
“deck-stacking” account, we find no indication that panel composition reflects
the preferences of the legislative coalition that enacted the legislation creating the
committee.
We should emphasize that our aggregate findings and four case studies do not
rule out the possibility that advisory committees ever serve congressional interests. Surely sometimes they do. As an example of a panel that was especially
effective in this regard, Balla and Wright—the most prominent proponents of the
“congressional control” view—point to the Advisory Committee on Student
328. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246 (2001).
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Financial Assistance, which was established as part of the Higher Education Act
Amendments of 1986329 and remained in operation until 2015.330 The committee,
which had its own six-member staff, communicated directly with the Legislative
Branch in the drafting of the 1992 and 1998 reauthorizations of the Higher
Education Act.331 According to a former congressional staffer, the committee
“emerged as an important source of information and guidance” for Congress in
crafting education policy.332
The Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance is more likely the
exception than the rule. A number of the panel’s unusual features distinguished it
from the mine-run of advisory committees. First, the committee was almost
entirely independent of the Department of Education—it had its own budget,
and its reports to Congress were not subject to the Education Secretary’s preapproval.333 Second, the committee had authority to hire its own employees,334 freeing it from reliance on the Education Department for staff support. Finally, the
Education Secretary named only a minority of the panel’s members (three out of
eleven).335 Four members were appointed by the President pro tempore of the
Senate—two on the recommendation of the Senate Majority Leader, two on
the recommendation of the Senate Minority Leader336—and a similar structure
allowed the majority and minority parties in the House to split control over the
four remaining spots.337
The contrasts between the Advisory Committee on Student Financial
Assistance and the shallow state story in Parts II and III suggest a number of lessons for lawmakers seeking to strengthen the role of advisory panels as instruments of congressional control over administrative agencies. Enshrining a
committee in a statute is unlikely to be enough to ensure that the committee
remains a robust monitor of agency activities and a participant in the policymaking process. If the committee is dependent upon an agency for financial and staff
support, then it may be constrained in its ability to function as an independent
voice. Moreover, FACA’s “fairly balanced” requirement is far too loose to prevent panel membership from following the preferences of the presidential administration. Even more specific membership criteria (such as the statutory
requirement that the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee include a physician, a National Academy of Sciences member, and representative of state air
pollution control agencies)338 are not sufficient to stop the partisan ebb and flow.

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Pub. L. No. 99-498, § 491, 100 Stat. 1268, 1492 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1098 (2012)).
20 U.S.C. § 1098(k) (2012).
See Balla & Wright, Can Advisory Committees, supra note 13, at 181.
See id. at 182.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1098(b).
See id. § 1098(h)(1).
See id. § 1098(c)(1)(C).
See id. § 1098(c)(1)(A).
See id. § 1098(c)(1)(B).
See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
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How, then, can lawmakers—or at least, lawmakers who take seriously their
responsibility of congressional oversight—leverage advisory committees as tools
of that task? Independent funding and separate staff for advisory committees may
be important steps, but they cannot be the only steps. Placing budget and staff
beyond the control of an agency head will not ensure that the advisory committee
acts as an effective check if the agency head still has plenary power to appoint
and remove committee members.
One option is to follow the model of the Advisory Committee on Student
Financial Assistance: allocate appointment authority among Senate and House
leaders. The obvious advantage of this approach is that it allows members of
Congress to install committee members who are more likely to serve as faithful
“fire-alarm” monitors. The potential objections are constitutional and practical.
The constitutional objection—though it is a rather weak one—would be that
Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 reserves the power of appointment to the President,
the courts, and the “Heads of Department.”339 We say that it is a rather weak
objection because the Appointments Clause has long been understood not to
apply to “purely advisory” positions.340
The practical problems with congressional appointment of advisory committee
members are more serious. Recall that there are more than 75,000 such positions.
If the House and Senate Majority and Minority Leaders were to divide those posts
among themselves, each would be responsible for nearly 19,000 appointments.
With two-year terms, that would mean more than twenty-five appointments for
each leader each day (including weekends and holidays). Vetting responsibilities
could be farmed out to other caucus members or to staffers, but even so, the scope
of the shallow state is likely too vast to make congressional appointment of every
advisory committee member a sensible strategy. The congressional-appointment
approach may be viable for a select number of high-profile committees (and
given the significant stakes associated with national ambient-air-quality standards, the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee may be among this select

339. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
340. This proposition is arguably implicit in Supreme Court opinions stating that the Appointments
Clause applies only to individuals who exercise “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States.” See, e.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976)
(per curiam); see also Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662 (1997) (“The exercise of ‘significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States’ marks . . . , as we said in Buckley, the line between
officer and non-officer.”).
Further, the proposition is explicit in opinions of the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel
stating that a “purely advisory position” is not an office of the United States and its occupant is not an
officer to whom the Appointments Clause applies. See Officers of the United States Within the Meaning
of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 77 (2007) (stating that “an individual who occupies a
purely advisory position (one having no legal authority) . . . does not hold a federal office” for purposes
of the Appointments Clause); Application of the Emoluments Clause to a Member of the President’s
Council on Bioethics, 29 Op. O.L.C. 55, 63, 71 (2005) (stating that “a purely advisory position” is not an
office for purposes of the Foreign Emoluments Clause and that the scope of the Foreign Emoluments
Clause matches the scope of the Appointments Clause).
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number). If Congress is to tame the shallow state, however, it will likely need to
consider other alternatives.
Another option is to mandate partisan balance on certain advisory committees.
In other work, we have together examined the effect of partisan balance requirements on the ideological composition of independent regulatory commissions
such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), and we have found that these requirements do in fact operate
as meaningful constraints—especially in more recent years.341 Again using campaign contributions as a proxy for appointee preferences, we find that individuals
appointed to cross-party seats on multimember commissions tend to be genuine
members of the opposition party. That is, President Obama generally named conservative Republicans—rather than “Republicans in name only”—to cross-party
seats, and President George W. Bush generally named liberal Democrats. The efficacy of partisan balance requirements in the context of independent regulatory
commissions suggests that similar mandates might help Congress maintain ideological balance on advisory committees.
Although we think this suggestion deserves serious consideration, we note a
number of caveats as well. For one, the low profile of many advisory committees
and the lack of a Senate confirmation requirement may limit the efficacy of party
balance mandates in that context. Although the media can be expected to highlight instances in which a President seeks to manipulate the ideological composition of a high-profile commission such as the FTC,342 and although Senators from
the opposing party might be expected to object in the confirmation process, the
sheer number of advisory committee appointments may limit the extent to which
partisan balance requirements for those panels can be policed.
The mirror image of the above concern is that partisan balance requirements
may prove too constraining in the advisory committee context. In some instances,
expertise may be more important than ideology, and finding an ideologically
diverse group of experts may be difficult. For example, one recent study finds that
the ratio of registered Democrats to registered Republicans on the history faculties
of forty elite universities is 33.5 to 1.343 For an advisory committee whose work
requires advanced knowledge of historical study, such as the nine-member State
Department Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation,344 it

341. See Feinstein & Hemel, supra note 158, at 15.
342. See, e.g., id. at 41–48; see also Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Washington Watch; No Democrats Seen
for F.T.C., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/10/28/business/washingtonwatch-no-democrats-seen-for-ftc.html.
343. See Mitchell Langbert et al., Faculty Voter Registration in Economics, History, Journalism,
Law, and Psychology, 13 ECON J. WATCH 422, 425 fig.2 (2016).
344. See 22 U.S.C. § 4356(a)(1) (2012) (establishing Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic
Documentation); id. § 4356(a)(3) (requiring that members of committee be “appointed by the Secretary
of State from among distinguished historians, political scientists, archivists, international lawyers, and
other social scientists who have a demonstrable record of substantial research pertaining to the foreign
relations of the United States”).
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could be a challenge to achieve partisan balance while maintaining a high level of
subject-matter expertise.345
The challenge does not appear to us to be insuperable, however. Note that partisan balance requirements typically limit the number of members from any one
party; they do not mandate equal representation from both parties.346 Thus, a
simple-majority partisan-balance requirement applied to the Advisory Committee
on Historical Diplomatic Documentation would limit the number of Democrats
on the panel to five. The remaining four members could be Republicans, independents, Libertarians, Green Party registrants, and so on. The same study that found
that Democrats outnumber Republicans on history faculties by a 33.5-to-1 margin
also found that forty-two percent of academic historians are not affiliated with either party.347 Thus, even in this rather extreme case, the State Department could
likely satisfy a typical partisan-balance requirement by naming independents to
the non-Democratic seats on the committee if it could not find a sufficient number
of registered Republicans with the requisite qualifications.
Although partisan balance requirements may strengthen the “fire-alarm” function of advisory committees, we are substantially more skeptical that they will
work as “deck-stacking” tools. Recall that the theory of “deck-stacking” was to
conform the composition of advisory committees to the preferences of the enacting coalition in Congress. If the enacting coalition comprised primarily members
of one party, deck-stacking would seem to suggest that the advisory committee
should be skewed toward that party too. But a requirement that, say, ninety percent of an advisory committee’s members must be Republican because ninety
percent of the lawmakers who voted for the bill creating the committee were
Republican seems quite unlikely. A “partisan imbalance” requirement of this sort
would be vulnerable to a constitutional challenge on First Amendment
grounds,348 and even apart from constitutional considerations, the poor optics of
345. One might legitimately wonder whether ideology is even relevant to the work of a panel such as
the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation. The answer appears to be yes. The
committee participated in the State Department’s 2014 decision to publish documents related to the
Central Intelligence Agency’s role in the 1953 overthrow of the Iranian Prime Minister. See Steven
Aftergood, History of 1953 CIA Covert Action in Iran to Be Published, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS (Apr. 16,
2014), https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2014/04/iran-frus [https://perma.cc/3JCJ-AZCK]. The Trump
Administration sought to disband the panel in 2017 but backtracked after realizing that the panel’s
continued existence had been codified by Congress. See Charles Levinson, Under Trump, Expert Panels
on the Decline, REUTERS (July 30, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-panels/undertrump-expert-advisory-panels-on-the-decline-idUSKCN1UP15J [https://perma.cc/S3FF-ZL8L]. The
committee’s chair, an academic historian, recently noted concerns about “politicization” of the panel.
See id. (quoting Richard Immerman).
346. See Feinstein & Hemel, supra note 158, at 19.
347. See Langbert et al., supra note 343, at 433.
348. The constitutional challenge would have considerable force, but it would also involve
considerable complications. The Supreme Court has held that public employment cannot be conditioned
on party affiliation under the First Amendment. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 75 (1990).
A plaintiff challenging a “partisan imbalance” requirement would face a formidable obstacle, though, in
establishing standing. Two challenges to partisan balance requirements for independent regulatory
commissions have failed on standing grounds. See Nat’l Comm. of the Reform Party v. Democratic
Nat’l Comm., 168 F.3d 360, 365 (9th Cir. 1999); FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 824
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an explicit statutory preference for one party over another would seem to be a
dealbreaker.
Before applying partisan balance requirements to advisory committees,
though, members of Congress should consider whether the partisan balance on
those panels is indeed desirable. There is a strong argument that the status quo—
under which agency heads can stack advisory committees with their ideological
allies—adds to the legitimacy of the administrative state. We consider that argument in section V.D. The key point for present purposes is that, if advisory committees are intended as instruments of congressional control over the
administrative state, then it is doubtful whether they fulfill that purpose. But as
we discuss below, the ability of political appointees to shape the composition of
panels may be a feature—not a bug—of the advisory committee system.
B. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND THE SHALLOW STATE

While our findings indicate that advisory committees are weaker instruments
of congressional control over the administrative state than some political scientists have suggested, our conclusions also suggest that advisory committees may
be more effective tools of presidential control over agencies than some scholars
and judges had feared. Recall again then-Professor Bybee’s concern that FACA’s
fair-balance requirement—among other provisions of the 1972 law—would
undermine the utility of advisory committees in the President’s eyes. Professor
Bybee acknowledged that the evidence for his claim was “anecdotal,”349 and our
more systematic analysis suggests the opposite: FACA’s fair balance requirement
and more specific statutory membership criteria do not in fact prevent political
appointees from stacking advisory committees with their co-partisans.350
Our results suggest a role for advisory committees in addressing what is arguably
the central challenge in public administration: the tradeoff between expertise and

(D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Feinstein & Hemel, supra note 158, at 21–22 (discussing these cases). A
Democrat or Independent—in our hypothetical involving a pro-Republican partisan imbalance
requirement—might argue that she has suffered a “denial of a fair opportunity to compete” for an
advisory committee position. See Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1235–36 (10th Cir.
2004) (finding—at a preliminary stage—that two individuals have standing to challenge the composition
of an advisory committee that was required by regulation to have a “fair membership balance”). The
argument would be far from certain to succeed, however. Cf. Pub. Citizen v. Nat’l Advisory Comm. on
Microbiological Criteria for Foods, 886 F.2d 419, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (Silberman, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (stating that plaintiffs lack standing to challenge composition of advisory
committee on the ground that it fails to satisfy FACA’s fair balance requirement).
349. Bybee, supra note 14, at 125.
350. In Professor Bybee’s defense, the fair balance requirement was not the only FACA provision
that concerned him. FACA’s open meeting and public inspection requirements may (though may not)
inhibit advisory committee members from giving their unvarnished views on controversial subjects. Id.
Our case studies highlight instances in which panel members provided information and policy
recommendations that contravened the advice of career civil servants and appeared to align with the
administration’s agenda—examples that suggest that these committees remain quite useful to the
President. But we cannot, concededly, observe the counterfactual in which advisory committees meet
behind closed doors and offer their advice to political appointees out of public view. FACA has not
allowed that for nearly a half century.
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responsiveness.351 Presidents and other political principals require expertise in
order to translate their high-level objectives into real-world results. This requirement of expertise arises in part out of complexity: one needs vast technical
knowledge—more than any single person likely possesses—in order to design an
efficacious system of bank regulations or air quality standards. It also arises out
of judicial review, which forces agencies to justify their actions in terms that will
hold up to court scrutiny.352 The problem for Presidents and their administrations
is that the career civil servants who possess the necessary expertise to translate
high-level objectives into successful policies may not share the President’s highlevel objectives. The advisory committee structure allows Presidents and their political appointees to enlist the assistance of sympathetic outside experts without
having to contend with the cumbersome restrictions on hiring and firing federal
employees.353
If advisory committees truly help presidential administrations address the
expertise-responsiveness tradeoff, then President Trump’s recent actions regarding advisory committees present a puzzle. In June 2019, President Trump ordered
all executive agencies to terminate one-third of their self-created committees by
the end of September 2019.354 He also imposed a requirement that agencies
obtain a waiver from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) before creating a new panel if the number of existing agency-created committees across the
Executive Branch exceeds 350 (excluding committees attached to independent
regulatory agencies).355 Why would a President restrict the creation—and order
the destruction—of advisory bodies that can advance his agenda?
History offers a possible answer. This is not the first time that a President has
ordered a reduction of one-third in the number of advisory committees or mandated that new committees be cleared by OMB. Indeed, President Clinton issued
an almost identical order in February 1993.356 The number of advisory committees fell from 1305 in fiscal year 1993 to a trough of 921 five years later—a
decline of twenty-nine percent—but the number of members rose by forty-five

351. On the tradeoff between expertise and responsiveness, see generally Francis E. Rourke,
Responsiveness and Neutral Competence in American Bureaucracy, 52 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 539 (1992).
352. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 34 (1983)
(holding that agencies must provide adequate reasons to support their decisions); United States v. Nova
Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 249 (2d Cir. 1977) (“Adequate review of a determination
requires an adequate record . . . .”).
353. See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a New
President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 612 (2003). As Mendelson notes, political appointees may
review and influence civil service hiring decisions, see id. at 611, but this has nuanced implications for
the expertise-responsiveness tradeoff. Within administrations, it may allow political appointees to
choose civil servants whose preferences align with the President’s. Across administrations, it may have
the opposite effect: political appointees in an outgoing administration may “burrow” likeminded
individuals in the civil service so that the incoming President faces a more resistant bureaucracy. See id.
at 612.
354. Exec. Order No. 13,875, 84 Fed. Reg. 28,711, 28,711 (June 19, 2019).
355. Id.
356. Exec. Order No. 12,838, 58 Fed. Reg. 8,207, 8,207 (Feb. 10, 1993).
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percent during the same period and spending rose by more than a quarter.357 The
reduction in the number of committees does not appear to have prevented these
panels from serving the function that the shallow state model posits. To the contrary, involving the White House more directly in the advisory committee formation process may serve to reinforce the role of these panels as instruments of the
presidential administration.358
C. THE JUDICIARY AND THE SHALLOW STATE

The implications of our findings for judicial review of agency action are crosscutting. Recall the argument by Sheila Jasanoff that concordance between advisory committees and agency staff should be seen by courts as prima facie
evidence of the reasonableness of the agency’s position.359 On the one hand, the
fact that advisory committee composition reflects not only expertise but also the
ideological preferences of the presidential administration might weigh against
Jasanoff’s argument. If advisory committees are not neutral arbiters of scientific
fact, but bodies with distinct ideological leanings, then perhaps courts should consider the committees’ conclusions with skepticism. On the other hand, if agency
heads use advisory committees as counterweights to the career civil service—as

357. Compare U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-GGD-98-24, FEDERAL ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ACT: OVERVIEW OF ADVISORY COMMITTEES SINCE 1993, at 9 (1998), with REPORTING
FISCAL YEAR 1998 GOVERNMENT TOTALS, FACA DATABASE (2017), https://www.facadatabase.gov/
FACA/apex/FACAPublicTotals?fy=1998 [https://perma.cc/2PNR-2VZZ] (last visited July 31, 2019)
(comparing total number of committees, committee members, and committee costs in 1993 to those in
1998).
358. History does not always repeat. The Trump Administration is different from previous
administrations in all sorts of ways. It has been much slower than its predecessors to fill Senate-confirmed
posts across the Executive Branch—despite the fact that the Senate is controlled by the President’s own
party, and despite the fact that the filibuster no longer applies to nominations. See Juliet Eilperin, Josh
Dawsey & Seung Min Kim, ‘It’s Way Too Many’: As Vacancies Pile Up in Trump Administration,
Senators Grow Concerned, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2019, 3:53 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/health-science/its-way-too-many-as-vacancies-pile-up-in-trump-administration-senators-growconcerned/2019/02/03/c570eb94-24b2-11e9-ad53-824486280311_story.html. The reasons for this
torpid pace are not entirely clear, but one possible explanation is that opposition to President Trump
among elites in academia, law, and even business has reduced the pool of qualified people willing to
serve in executive branch positions. See Lisa Rein & Abby Phillip, Help Wanted: Why Republicans
Won’t Work for the Trump Administration, WASH. POST (June 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/help-wanted-why-republicans-wont-work-for-the-trump-administration/2017/06/17/61e3d33e506a-11e7-b064-828ba60fbb98_story.html. If this phenomenon is real, it may affect the Trump
Administration’s ability to fill advisory committee posts with experts who will serve as counterweights to
career staff.
The data do not yet bear out this prediction. The total number of advisory committees in the first full
fiscal year of the Trump Administration is almost exactly equal to the number of committees in the last
full fiscal year of the Obama Administration (declining trivially from 1006 in fiscal year 2016 to 1003
two years later). Compare REPORTING FISCAL YEAR 2016 GOVERNMENT TOTALS (2016), FACA
DATABASE, https://www.facadatabase.gov/FACA/apex/FACAPublicTotals?fy=2016 [https://perma.cc/
P6X3-ZYJN] (last visited July 31, 2019), with FACA DATABASE, supra note 1. The number of members
has risen by 4.7 percent; the number of meetings has declined by one percent; and total spending has
remained stable. Id. So far, we see no evidence that advisory committees have ceased to be instruments
of presidential administration under Trump.
359. See JASANOFF, supra note 5, at 249.
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our results in Part III suggest—then perhaps the fact that committees and careerists agree should be an especially powerful indication that the agency’s position
is correct.
Importantly, the composition of advisory committees is likely endogenous to
the legal environment in which they operate. By that, we mean that if concordance between advisory committees and agency staff was taken by courts to be
prima facie evidence of the reasonableness of the agency’s position, then agency
heads—even at agencies where the preferences of civil servants are aligned with
the President’s—would have a strong incentive to convene these committees,
stack them with ideological allies, and use them to insulate the agency’s position
from judicial interrogation. This endogeneity claim also has potential implications for Adrian Vermeule’s argument that agencies should be required to abide
by the recommendations of expert panels unless they can supply a valid secondorder reason for doing otherwise.360 The more weight that courts place on advisory committees, the less likely—we think—they are to be a “parliament of
experts” and the more likely they are to be a “parliament of partisans.”
Our observations are speculative because—as Vermeule notes—current doctrine does not require agencies to hew to the views of expert panels (or else to
supply a valid second-order reason for deviating).361 Our finding that panel composition changes with the partisan ebb and flow might be seen as bolstering the
current rule. At the very least, our results regarding panel partisanship merit consideration as part of any proposal to enhance the role of advisory committees in
judicial review of agency action.
D. THE DEEP STATE AND THE SHALLOW STATE

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, our findings shed light on the debate
over the American administrative “deep state”—a term that has gained new currency in the two years since President Trump’s inauguration. As Jon Michaels
observes, “[b]roadly speaking, prior to 2017 our deep state has simply been
referred to as our state.”362 At the deep state’s center, Michaels notes, lie “the vast
expanse of federal administrative agencies” and “the personnel entrusted with the
day-to-day operations of those agencies.”363 Michaels argues that the American
bureaucracy—which he sees as transparent, inclusive, and diverse—“often serves
as the last, if not best, check on presidential and agency-head overreach.”364

360. See Vermeule, supra note 99, at 2235.
361. See id. at 2242; see also Metzger, supra note 27, at 452 n.128 (noting that the involvement of
expert advisory committees is not “generally deemed an acceptable basis for expanded deference”).
Only occasionally will a court mention an advisory committee’s approval or disapproval as a factor in its
decision regarding the reasonableness of agency action. See, e.g., Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F.
Supp. 2d 212, 230–34 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). And even in those relatively rare cases, the advisory
committee’s view is one among many factors, not prima facie evidence of reasonableness or
unreasonableness. See id.
362. Michaels, supra note 20, at 1655.
363. Id. at 1655–56.
364. Id. at 1660, 1665.
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Critics of the bureaucratization of American governance, on the other hand, have
long-expressed concerns about the concentration of power in the hands of agencies who are accountable to voters only tenuously, if at all.365
Our findings inform (but do not resolve) this debate over what scholars refer to
as the “new” or “internal” separation of powers—that is, the checks on executive
power that arise from within the Executive Branch.366 Advisory committees—by
providing political appointees with an alternative to the civil service as a source
of expertise—tilt the internal balance of power further in the political appointees’
direction, even though they do not always tip the scales. In this respect, the shallow state ought to temper conclusions about the deep state’s influence, which,
depending upon one’s attitude toward internal separation, may be a cause for
comfort or concern.
Considering the ways in which advisory committees do and do not function as
serviceable substitutes for career staff can also help us understand the circumstances in which internal checks and balances will be most robust. Advisory committees, we posit, will be most useful to political appointees when the rate-limiting
factor on policy development is the ability to collect and analyze information.
Advisory committees can do that too—and in some cases, can do so as well as or
even better than the civil servants inside agencies. When, for example, the task
facing the Health and Human Services Secretary or his delegee is to determine
the appropriate parts-per-billion limit for arsenic in drinking water and to substantiate that decision so as to satisfy judicial review, advisory committees potentially allow the Secretary to overcome civil servant resistance. Where advisory
committees will be less useful, however, is when the challenge is one of implementation rather than information. For example, it is exceedingly unlikely that
the Health and Human Services Secretary could rely on an advisory committee to
build a working version of Healthcare.gov (though as three prominent commentators argued in the wake of the Healthcare.gov debacle, a technical advisory committee that included IT professionals, state officials, and insurance industry
representatives might play a useful role in developing a workplan for site
maintenance).367
The information–implementation dichotomy is a fuzzy one. General
Cartwright’s discussion of DACOWITS illustrates the blur: advisory committee
members, by identifying and reporting problems with specific units at particular
locations,368 facilitated the implementation of the Clinton Administration’s
agenda. And even on the information-gathering side, advisory committee support
365. On the justifications for bureaucratization (and for a critique of those justifications), see
generally Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276
(1984).
366. See Michaels, supra note 27, at 229; Katyal, supra note 27, at 2316–17.
367. See Neera Tanden, Zeke Emanuel & Topher Spiro, A New Management Structure for a New
Phase of the Affordable Care Act, CTR. AM. PROGRESS, (May 17, 2014, 7:00 AM), https://www.
americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/reports/2014/05/17/89780/a-new-management-structure-for-anew-phase-of-the-affordable-care-act [https://perma.cc/9L27-7D56].
368. See Dua, supra note 222.
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is not always a perfect substitute for civil servant cooperation. Consider again the
example of ICE and the Advisory Committee on Family Residential Centers.
According to advisory committee members, entrenched bureaucrats at ICE
sought to circumscribe the Committee’s information-gathering activities.369 The
deep state sometimes may be able to keep the shallow state in the dark.
Ultimately, our conclusion is not that advisory committees allay all concerns
about bureaucratization or that these panels always allow political appointees to
overcome civil servant resistance. The complexity of public administration is
rarely amenable to absolutes. Our more modest claim is that, when knowledge is
power, then advisory committees—by providing political appointees with an alternative base of knowledge—also supply them with an additional power source.
Yet knowledge is not always power; sometimes power lies in the ability to implement policies of national scope. The relative importance of information versus
implementation will be a significant factor in whether the shallow state can or
cannot counterbalance the deep.
CONCLUSION
The story that emerges from our study is partly one of conflict. Advisory committees, we find, are most likely to be utilized when preferences of political
appointees diverge from those of careerists—when the power centers within the
agency are at odds with one another. The composition of advisory committees,
moreover, reflects the partisan tussle. “To the victor belong the spoils”370 no longer describes the allocation of most federal jobs in our post-patronage age, but it
still applies—more or less—to advisory committee posts.
But our story is also one of symbiosis. The shallow state, we suggest, can bolster the deep state in several ways. By double-checking the findings and judgments of career civil servants, advisory committees can validate the
bureaucracy’s advice in the eyes of political appointees. By checking the
bureaucracy’s informational power, advisory committees can also assuage concerns about the deep state’s lack of democratic accountability. They might, moreover, be able to enhance congressional oversight over administrative agencies,
though this—as we suggest—may require the insertion of partisan balance
requirements into committee charters.
The relationship operates in both directions. Some might see our findings
regarding the partisan ebb and flow of advisory committee composition as damning to the shallow state. But our analysis above suggests another possible account.

369. See Schriro, supra note 263, at 465.
370. The statement is attributed to then-Senator William L. Marcy of New York, a Jacksonian
Democrat, who in January 1832 was defending President Jackson’s appointment of Martin Van Buren as
Minister to England. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE
OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1840, at 250 (1969). Rather ironically, the spoils did not
belong to the victor in that case: Van Buren’s nomination was defeated in the Senate. DANIEL WALKER
HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815–1848, at 378 (David M.
Kennedy ed., 2007).
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Precisely because civil servants are not themselves “neutral” experts, the nonneutrality of advisory committees can be understood as a needed counterweight.
Even apart from the countless cases in which agency staffers and advisory committees cooperate outright, their conflicts can be seen as mutualistic and not
purely antagonistic.
In the end, then, the “fifth branch” of advisory committees deserves a place on
conceptual maps of federal administration, not only because of the independent
significance of these panels but also because of their importance to the federal
government’s other elements. These 75,000 sets of eyes and ears significantly
augment the Executive Branch’s capacity to gather and synthesize information
while also undermining the civil service’s informational monopoly. As the
administrative state endures growing criticism from scholars and judges who
question the immense influence of unelected agency officials,371 defenders of the
status quo can point to the use of advisory committees as one more mechanism
that checks the power of careerists and connects agency decisonmaking to electoral outcomes. In addition to providing agencies with subject-matter expertise
and technical advice, then, advisory committees can offer agencies a measure of
political accountability as well. For an “administrative state under siege” from
those who question its democratic legitimacy, this may now be precisely what
agencies most need.372

371. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under
Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8–51, 71 (2017) (summarizing “anti-administrativist” arguments).
372. Id. at 1.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix reports regression results for our tripartite assessment of advisory committees’ reputation-boosting potential for agencies. First, we examine
whether agency engagement with advisory committees is associated with fewer
reported infractions in the next year. (As usual, we operationalized “engagement”
in three ways: new committees, committee budget, and committee meetings.)
Table A.1 reports the results.
TABLE A.1: COMMITTEE ACTIVITY AND FUTURE INFRACTIONS

Second, we analyze whether greater engagement with advisory committees is
associated with agencies being the subject of fewer congressional oversight hearings in the next year.373 Table A.2 reports these results.
TABLE A.2: COMMITTEE ACTIVITY AND FUTURE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

373. Data on congressional oversight hearings obtained from Frank Baumgartner & Bryan Jones,
Congressional Hearings, Comparative Agendas Project: U.S. Policy Agendas, www.comparative
agendas.net/us [https://perma.cc/QG5N-54Y6].
For a description of our method for identifying which hearings in the Baumgartner & Jones database
qualify as “oversight,” see Brian D. Feinstein, Congress in the Administrative State, 95 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1189, 1215 (2018). This measure is available only for the 1997–2012 period.
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Third, we determine whether agencies that engage more with advisory committees in one year receive increases in their discretionary budget authority in the
next.374 Congress may be more apt to fund agencies held in high esteem, so a positive relationship between an agency’s engagement with committees and a boost
in that agency’s discretionary budget would support the notion that engagement
with advisory committees enhances an agency’s reputation. Table A.3 reports
correlations between our three measures of committee engagement and the
inflation-adjusted percentage change in Congress’s grant of discretionary budget
authority to the agency in the next year.375
TABLE A.3: COMMITTEE ACTIVITY AND FUTURE AGENCY FUNDING

These analyses yield null results; we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
these measures of advisory committee engagement are unconnected to agency
infractions in the previous year, future agency budget growth, agency infractions
in the next year, or congressional oversight hearings held in the next year. To the
extent that these activities serve as proxies for reputation, these results cast doubt
on the notion that agencies can boost their reputations through greater engagement with advisory committees.

374. Budget data obtained from OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 205. Figures expressed in
2016 dollars, converted using Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject: CPI Inflation Calculator,
DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm [https://perma.cc/XA4P-7D4S]
(last visited Nov. 11, 2019).
375. Given the slow, path-dependent nature of agency-level changes in the federal budget in most
years, see Bryan D. Jones et al., An Integrated Theory of Budgetary Politics, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 561,
561 (2014), this relative lack of year-to-year budgetary change is unsurprising. As a check, we also
regressed these same explanatory variables on budget authority two and third years out. The results are
substantially similar.
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